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ABSTRACT
We examine whether internal governance affects the extent of real earnings 
management in U.S. corporations. Internal governance refers to the process 
through which key subordinate executives provide checks and balances in 
the organization and affect corporate decisions. Using the number of years to
retirement to capture key subordinate executives’ horizon incentives and 
using their compensation relative to CEO compensation to capture their 
influence within the firm, we find that the extent of real earnings 
management decreases with key subordinate executives’ horizon and 
influence. The results are robust to alternative measures of internal 
governance and to various approaches used to address potential 
endogeneity including a difference-in-differences approach. In cross-sectional
analyses, we find that the effect of internal governance is stronger for firms 
with more complex operations where key subordinate executives’ 
contribution is higher, is enhanced when CEOs are less powerful, is weaker 
when the capital markets benefit of meeting or beating earnings benchmarks
is higher, and is stronger in the post-SOX period. This paper contributes to 
the literature by examining how internal governance affects the extent of 
real earnings management and by shedding light on how the members of the
management team work together in shaping financial reporting quality. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
We examine whether internal governance affects the extent of real 
earnings management.1 Internal governance refers to the process through 
which key subordinate executives provide checks and balances in the 
organization and affect corporate decisions.2 We focus on key subordinate 
executives, or specifically the top four executives with the highest 
compensation other than the CEO, because we hypothesize that they are the
most likely group of employees that have both the incentive and the ability 
to influence the CEO in corporate decisions. As argued in Acharya, Myers, 
and Rajan (2011), key subordinate executives have strong incentives not to 
take actions that increase short-term performance at the expense of long-
term firm value. This tradeoff between current and future firm value is 
particularly salient in the case of real earnings management because 
overproduction and cutting of R&D expenditures are costly and can reduce 
the long-term value of the firm (e.g., Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal 2005; 
Bhojraj, Hribar, Picconi, and McInnis 2009; Cohen and Zarowin 2010). In 
addition, we expect these key subordinate executives to have more direct 
impact on corporate decisions, such as research and development, 
production, and other activities that affect operating cash flows, and as a 
result, the extent of real earnings management. In contrast, these 
1 Following Roychowdhury (2006, 336), we define real earnings management as 
“management actions that deviate from normal business practices, undertaken with the 
primary objective of meeting certain earnings thresholds.” Some papers in the literature 
refer to “real earnings management” as “real activities management.” 
2 We use the term “internal governance” to be consistent with some of the closely related 
studies (e.g., Acharya et al. 2011). We refer to governance mechanisms other than the 
monitoring by the key subordinate executives broadly as “other governance mechanisms.” 
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executives, with the exception of the CFO, have little direct influence on the 
accrual process. Thus, we focus on real earnings management in this paper. 
The motivation for the research question is two-fold. First, the majority 
of the papers in the literature explicitly or implicitly assume that the CEO is 
the sole decision maker for financial reporting quality, which includes both 
accrual and real earnings management.3 Focusing only on the CEO does not 
provide a complete picture because firm management is typically a shared 
effort of all top executives (Finkelstein 1992). Recent literature starts to 
examine how CFOs affect the quality of financial reporting (e.g., Jiang, 
Petroni, and Wang 2010; Feng, Ge, Luo, and Shevlin 2011). However, the 
impact of other executives has been largely overlooked. As discussed briefly 
below and in detail in Section II, recent studies argue that subordinate 
executives usually have longer decision horizons and they can influence 
corporate decisions through various means. We hypothesize that differential 
preferences arising from differential horizons can affect the extent of real 
earnings management. 
Second, while there are studies focusing on the impact of various 
corporate governance mechanisms on corporate decisions (e.g., board 
independence and institutional ownership), little is known about whether 
there are checks and balances within the management team. This lack of 
knowledge is an important omission because control is not just imposed from
the top-down or from the outside, but also from the bottom-up (Fama 1980). 
3 Some papers pool all top five executives covered in the ExecuComp database together and
examine their collective influence on financial reporting (e.g., Cheng and Warfield 2005). 
The distinct impact of other executives is not identified in such analyses. 
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Key subordinate executives usually care more about the long-term firm 
value than the CEO for several important reasons. First, as argued in Acharya
et al. (2011), some of these executives desire to become the CEO in the 
future. As candidates for the CEO position in the future, key subordinate 
executives care about cash flows that the firm can generate in the future, 
which are in turn a function of the firm’s current investments. As a result, 
these executives are less likely to sacrifice long-term investments to meet 
short-term earnings targets. Second, key subordinate executives have more 
to lose relative to their total wealth from corporate underperformance than 
the CEO. They are usually younger and have more remaining years of 
employment. As such, the potential loss of income for failing to find a 
comparable job in the future is high for younger executives and increases 
with horizon. Third, Fama (1980) argues that in general, a manager’s outside
opportunity wage depends on other managers’, including the CEO’s, actions 
and firm performance. This effect can motivate the key subordinate 
executives to be more long-term oriented and to exert monitoring on the 
CEO.
Not only do key subordinate executives have incentives to increase 
long-term firm value, they also have the means to influence corporate 
decisions toward their preferences. Prior research argues that because key 
subordinate executives’ effort is an important determinant of current cash 
flows and the CEO’s welfare, the CEO will consider key subordinate 
executives’ preferences when making important corporate decisions; 
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otherwise, subordinate executives might not work hard, hence reducing 
current and future cash flows and the CEO’s welfare (Allen and Gale 2000; 
Acharya et al. 2011). 
The above discussion implies that the effectiveness of internal 
governance depends on the decision horizon of key subordinate executives 
and the influence they have on the CEO. In this paper, we use the number of 
years until retirement age (assumed to be 65) to capture these executives’ 
decision horizon and we use the level of their compensation relative to the 
CEO’s to capture their influence. We expect that the longer the horizon and 
the higher the relative compensation, the more effective is internal 
governance, and the lower the extent of real earnings management. Of 
course, subordinate executives might have the same incentives as the CEO 
to increase short-term performance at the expense of long-term value. Or, 
subordinate executives might be afraid of the consequences of disobeying 
the CEO (e.g., being demoted or fired) and hence do not exert monitoring on 
the CEO.4 In addition, it is possible that the key subordinate executives are in
a tournament or competition for the CEO’s job with external candidates; as a 
result, they could undertake real earnings management to increase short-
term earnings and/or to curry favor with the CEO who likely plays an 
important role in selecting his/her successor. These possibilities introduce 
tension to our research question and thus whether internal governance can 
effectively reduce the extent of real earnings management is an empirical 
4 See Feng et al. (2011) for evidence on the role of powerful CEOs in influencing CFOs to 
undertake material accounting manipulations.
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question. 
We test our hypothesis using 11,994 firm-year observations from the 
S&P 1500 firms in the period 1993-2011. The empirical results are consistent
with our prediction. We find that the extent of real earnings management 
decreases with subordinate executives’ horizon and relative compensation. 
The results hold after we control for CEO and firm characteristics that might 
affect the extent of real earnings management (e.g., CEO horizon, CEO 
compensation structure, firm age, analyst coverage, firm size, firm 
performance, leverage, firm growth opportunities, and other governance 
mechanisms). When we split the sample firms into suspect firms – the 
subsample of firms that meet or just beat analysts’ forecasts – and other 
firms, we find that the results only hold for the suspect firms, where CEOs 
have incentives to engage in upward real earnings management. We do not 
find results for the other firms. The remaining analyses are thus based on the
sample of suspect firms.
In the main analyses, we use the relative compensation of the key 
subordinate executives to capture their ability to influence the CEO on key 
corporate decisions. An alternative interpretation of our results is that this 
proxy captures CEO entrenchment, not internal governance per se, and 
entrenched CEOs engage in more real earnings management. In an 
additional analysis, we use two alternative measures to investigate the 
robustness of our results and to address this alternative explanation. More 
specifically, we use the abnormal compensation of subordinate executives 
5
and whether the subordinate executives sit on other companies’ boards as 
alternative proxies for their influence. Our inferences based on these two 
alternative proxies remain the same.
As with many corporate governance studies, we recognize that our 
analyses might be subject to endogeneity concerns because firms’ internal 
governance is arguably endogenously determined. The factors that affect the
strength of internal governance might also affect the extent of real earnings 
management. We address this endogeneity concern using a number of 
approaches. First, we use the lagged values of internal governance in all our 
analyses and include a comprehensive list of control variables that are likely 
correlated with both internal governance and the extent of real earnings 
management. Second, we use an instrumental variable approach to further 
control for potential endogeneity concerns. Specifically, following related 
prior studies (e.g., Coles, Daniel, and Naveen 2006; Boone, Field, Karpoff, 
and Raheja 2007; Kale, Reis, and Venkateswaran 2009; Bebchuk, Cremers, 
and Peyer 2011), we use the two-year lagged value of internal governance, 
the industry-year median of internal governance, the number of named 
executives in the proxy statement, and an indicator for outside CEOs as 
instruments. Our inferences remain the same. Third, we adopt a difference-
in-differences design by examining the impact on the extent of real earnings 
management of the appointment of a subordinate executive as an 
independent director of another company (one of our alternative proxies for 
internal governance). We find that before such appointments, firms with 
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subordinate executives serving as independent directors of other companies 
do not differ in the extent of real earnings management from the firms 
without such subordinate executives. However, after such appointments, 
firms with subordinate executives serving as independent directors 
experience a significant decrease in the extent of real earnings management
compared to other firms. These tests indicate that our results are not driven 
by the potential endogeneity concern.5
To corroborate the inference from the main analyses, we conduct a 
series of cross-sectional analyses. First, key subordinate executives’ ability 
to influence the CEO’s decision hinges on their contribution to firm 
performance and we argue that their contribution is greater when the firm’s 
operations are more complex. Accordingly, we expect that the impact of 
internal governance is higher when operation complexity is higher. We use 
industry R&D intensity and a common factor based on the number of 
geographical segments, geographical sales concentration, and foreign sales 
to capture the complexity of a firm’s operations. The results are consistent 
with our prediction that the impact of internal governance is stronger when 
operation complexity is higher. Second, we find that the effect of internal 
governance is stronger when the CEO is more effectively monitored and less 
powerful, proxied for by higher board independence, higher institutional 
ownership, and an indicator for newly appointed outside CEOs. This result 
also indicates that other governance mechanisms can enhance subordinate 
5 Our cross-sectional analyses also mitigate the endogeneity concern because it is arguably 
harder for an omitted variable to explain both our main and cross-sectional findings.
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executives’ ability to influence the CEO’s decisions. Third, we find that the 
effect of internal governance is attenuated for firms in financial distress, for 
firms that routinely meet or beat earnings targets, and for firms with 
upcoming financing activities, presumably because subordinate executives 
have weaker incentives to constrain real earnings management when the 
capital markets benefit of meeting or beating earnings benchmarks is higher.
We also conduct a series of additional tests to ensure the robustness of 
our results and to provide additional insights. First, the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX)
Act exerts a shock to firms’ governance (e.g., requiring higher board 
independence) and the extent of real earnings management (Cohen, Dey, 
and Lys 2008). As such, we expect internal governance to be more effective 
in constraining the extent of real earnings management in the post-SOX 
period. Consistent with our prediction, we find that our results are stronger in
the post-SOX period than in the pre-SOX period. 
Second, we find that internal governance is more effective in 
constraining real earnings management for firms in more homogeneous and 
competitive industries, where CEOs presumably have greater career 
concerns and thus have stronger incentives to manage earnings to report 
better financial performance (Parrino 1997; DeFond and Park 1999). Lastly, 
we find that internal governance is less effective in constraining real 
earnings management for firms with large forthcoming fixed-date option 
grants, where CEOs presumably have incentives to engage in downward 
earnings management in order to reduce the exercise price of option grants 
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(e.g., McAnally, Srivastava, and Weaver 2008). 
This paper contributes to the literature in two important ways. First, this 
paper is the first to examine the association between internal governance 
and the extent of real earnings management. This examination is important 
as it sheds light on how the members of the management team work 
together and shape financial reporting. This paper differs from and 
complements studies on the impact of CFOs’ characteristics on accrual 
quality or the likelihood of earnings restatements/frauds by focusing on all 
key subordinate executives and by focusing on real earnings management. 
Second, our examination of internal governance helps provide a more 
complete picture of how firms work. Unlike prior research which generally 
views top executives as a unified team, this paper provides evidence that 
key subordinate executives can serve an important monitoring role and that 
effective internal governance can reduce the extent of CEOs’ myopic 
behavior. Our study answers Fama’s (1980, 293) call for research on internal 
governance. He argues that while each manager is concerned with the 
performance of others in the firm and as a consequence, undertakes certain 
monitoring of other managers, both above or below, “less well appreciated, 
however, is the monitoring that takes place from bottom to top.” 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a 
summary of prior research and develops hypotheses. Section III describes 
the sample and data and presents the research design. Section IV reports 
the main analysis of the impact of internal governance on the extent of real 
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earnings management, the analysis based on alternative proxies for internal 
governance, and analyses addressing the potential endogeneity concerns. 
Section V reports the cross-sectional analyses and Section VI additional 
analyses. Section VII concludes. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Literature Review
We rely and build on two steams of the earnings management literature:
the impact of individual executives on financial reporting quality and real 
earnings management. 
One of the fundamental drivers of earnings management is the pressure
on managers to deliver short-term performance that is used in contracting 
and firm valuation. See, for examples, DeFond and Park (1997) on the 
pressure related to job security, Matsunaga and Park (2001) on the pressure 
related to meeting earnings benchmarks, and Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn 
(2002) and Kasznik and McNichols (2002) on the capital market pressure to 
deliver short-term performance. A recent survey study, Dichev, Graham, 
Harvey, and Rajgopal (2013), concludes that “about 20 percent of firms 
manage earnings to misrepresent economic performance, and for such firms 
10 percent of EPS is typically managed.” Using a different research 
methodology, Dyck, Morse, and Zingales (2013) also conclude that earnings 
management and accounting frauds are prevalent. Given the vast literature 
on earnings management, we do not provide a detailed literature review 
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here and we refer readers to the review papers that discuss in greater detail 
the demand for earnings management and how managers benefit from this 
activity (e.g., Schipper 1989; Healy and Wahlen 1999; Dechow and Skinner 
2000; Fields, Lys, and Vincent 2001; Dechow, Ge, and Schrand 2010).6 
Most prior studies tend to focus on the management team as a whole or 
solely on the CEO as the person(s) held primarily responsible for earnings 
management within the firm. Recently, the literature starts to examine the 
effect of CFOs on earnings quality. For example, Geiger and North (2006) 
find that the appointment of new CFOs is associated with a decrease in 
discretionary accruals and that the result is largely driven by new CFOs who 
are hired from outside. Focusing on CFO directors, Bedard, Hoitash, and 
Hoitash (2014) find that firms with CFOs who sit on their own board exhibit 
higher reporting quality (e.g., lower likelihood of internal control weaknesses,
lower likelihood of restatements, and higher accruals quality). Ge, 
Matsumoto, and Zhang (2011) find that CFOs matter for various accounting 
choices, such as discretionary accruals, the likelihood of meeting or just 
beating earnings expectations, and the likelihood of restatements.7
There are also studies contrasting the impact of CFOs’ incentives with 
that of CEOs’ on earnings management. Jiang et al. (2010) find that the 
magnitude of accruals and the likelihood of meeting or just beating analysts’ 
6 While the literature focusses primarily on accrual-based earnings management, the 
argument on the demand for and the benefit (to managers) of earnings management apply 
to real earnings management as well. Indeed, the recent development of the real earnings 
management literature builds on prior studies of accrual-based earnings management.
7 Ge et al. (2011) capture the effect of CFO style by using a fixed effect model to track CFOs 
who work in multiple companies over their sample period.
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forecast are more sensitive to CFOs’ than to CEOs’ equity incentives in the 
pre-SOX period. In contrast, Feng et al. (2011) find that while CEOs of firms 
that are involved in material accounting manipulations (manipulations that 
violate GAAP) have higher equity incentives than their counterparts in other 
firms, CFOs of these accounting manipulation firms have similar levels of 
equity incentives as their counterparts in other firms. Despite their lack of 
incentives, CFOs who are involved in material accounting manipulations 
suffer substantial losses. Feng et al. conclude that the direct financial gain is 
not the main motivation for CFOs to be involved in earnings manipulation. 
Rather, CFOs likely succumb to powerful CEOs’ pressure to manipulate 
financial statements.
We extend this line of research by focusing on a broader set of key 
subordinate executives, including not only CFOs but also other top 
executives, and examine their impact on the extent of real earnings 
management. We focus on real earnings management for two reasons.8 First,
the tradeoff between increasing short-term performance and increasing long-
term firm value is important for real earnings management. For example, 
cutting R&D expenditures now to meet current year’s earnings targets will 
8 In an untabulated analysis, we examine the impact of internal governance on accrual 
earnings management. Ex-ante, whether non-CFO subordinate executives can influence the 
extent of accrual earnings management is unclear. On one hand, key subordinate 
executives do not play a direct role in accrual management because unlike the CFO, they 
are not directly involved in the financial reporting process. On the other hand, they likely 
have an important influence over the corporate culture and the overall corporate attitude 
toward earnings management. If the key subordinate executives focus on the long-term 
value of the firm, their preference might manifest in less accrual-based earnings 
management. After considering the interrelationship between real and accrual earnings 
management, we do not find robust evidence that subordinate executives have a significant 
impact on the extent of accrual earnings management, consistent with these executives 
playing a more limited role in the financial reporting process.
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lead to lower long-term investment and likely reduce the company’s ability 
to compete in the product markets and to generate profits in the future. 
Consistent with this notion, Bhojraj et al. (2009), Leggett, Parsons, and 
Reitenga (2009), and Mizik (2010) report that firms that reduce discretionary
spending to beat earnings benchmark exhibit long-term underperformance. 
Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and Mizik and Jacobson (2008) document that 
firms engaging in real earnings management prior to seasoned equity 
offerings have poorer operating performance in the future. Graham et al. 
(2005) also provide supporting evidence based on their surveys of CFOs.9 
Second and importantly, key subordinate executives have more direct 
control and influence over real activities, such as R&D expenditures, 
production volumes, and sales decisions, than over accrual-based earnings 
management. 
To our knowledge, ours is the first study that explicitly examines the 
impact of subordinate executives on the extent of real earnings 
management. The extant literature on real earnings management has 
focused primarily on documenting the existence of real earnings 
management. For example, Graham et al. (2005) report that 80 percent of 
surveyed CFOs stated that, in order to deliver earnings, they would decrease 
research and development (R&D), advertising, and maintenance 
9 In contrast, Gunny (2010) finds that firms engaging in real earnings management to report 
small positive earnings exhibit better subsequent performance and she attributes this result 
to the signaling role of real earnings management. In light of this contradictory evidence, in 
an untabulated analysis we examine the association between our real earnings 
management proxies and future performance in our sample. Unlike Gunny (2010), we find 
that our measures of real earnings management are associated with significantly lower one-
year-ahead returns on assets and cash flow from operations. 
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expenditures, while 55 percent said they would postpone a new project, both
of which are real activities manipulation. Roychowdhury (2006) documents 
the existence of real earnings management in firms that meet or just beat 
earnings benchmarks. Cohen et al. (2008) find that the extent of real 
earnings management is higher in the post-SOX period than in the pre-SOX 
period. We extend this line of research by examining how internal 
governance affects the extent of real earnings management, complementing
studies that examine the impact on real earnings management of other 
governance mechanisms, such as institutional ownership, board 
independence, and employment agreement (e.g., Bushee 1998; Carcello, 
Hollingsworth, Klein, and Neal 2006; Zhao 2011; Chen, Cheng, Lo, and Wang 
2015). 
Hypothesis Development
Main Hypothesis 
In this section, we discuss why key subordinate executives have both 
the incentive and ability to provide monitoring and reduce the extent of real 
earnings management. 
As discussed above, one of the fundamental drivers of earnings 
management is the pressure on CEOs to deliver short-term performance. 
While it is possible that key subordinate executives are under similar or even
greater pressure to deliver short-term performance, yet as compared to 
CEOs, key subordinate executives have longer horizons that induce them to 
care more about long-term firm value for three reasons. First, one of the 
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career objectives of many key subordinate executives is to become the next 
CEO when the current CEO retires or resigns. As documented in Cremers and
Grinstein (2011), 68.6 percent of CEOs are promoted within the firm; in other
words, in 68.6 percent of the CEO turnover cases, one of the key subordinate
executives becomes the next CEO.10 As the potential CEO in the future, these
subordinate executives care about the cash flows that the firm can generate 
in the future. Since a company’s performance depends critically on the 
capital stock (i.e., value enhancing assets), how the company performs when
the subordinate manager becomes the CEO depends on current investment. 
Thus, subordinate executives are hypothesized to care more about long-term
investment and therefore less likely to support activities that sacrifice long-
term positive NPV investments to meet short-term earnings targets. 
Second, subordinate executives have more to lose in the event of 
corporate underperformance and operational failures. Key subordinate 
executives are usually younger than the CEO. In our sample, they are three 
years younger at the sample median, and this difference represents a 30 
percent increase in the number of years of remaining employment (i.e., the 
number of years until the assumed retirement age of 65). Their future 
compensation likely represents a larger proportion of their overall income 
and wealth. While the CEO might also suffer from poor firm performance, the
concept of diminishing marginal utility suggests that the relative impact, i.e.,
10 Based on data from ExecuComp, we find that 59.7 percent of the CEOs in our sample were
promoted within the company. Within this group of CEOs, 36.0 percent were the Chief 
Operating Officer, 40.8 percent were the President, and 7.5 percent were the Vice President.
These statistics confirm that inside-CEOs are generally selected from the set of key 
subordinate executives we study.
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the impact of the potential loss related to the individual’s total wealth, is 
important. As such, lower compensation due to poor firm performance in the 
future or loss of income due to the difficulty of finding a comparable job is 
higher for younger executives and increases with their horizon. This is the 
same idea underlying the horizon problem discussed in Dechow and Sloan 
(1991). 
Third, Fama (1980) argues that in general, a manager’s outside 
opportunity wage depends on other managers’, including the CEO’s, actions 
and firm performance. This effect can motivate the key subordinate 
executives to be more long-term oriented and to exert monitoring on the 
CEO. 
The above discussion implies that subordinate executives have longer 
horizons than the CEO. The longer the subordinate executives’ horizon, the 
stronger their incentives not to sacrifice long-term value for short-term goals.
Not only do subordinate executives have incentives, they also have the 
means to influence the CEO’s decision. The current CEO’s welfare depends 
on the cash flow in the current period, which is affected by the key 
subordinate executives’ effort levels.11 If the CEO does not consider the 
subordinate executives’ interests, subordinate executives can work less 
diligently, hence reducing the current cash flow and the CEO’s welfare (Allen 
11 The importance of these key subordinate executives is self-evident. In a recent study, 
Graham, Harvey, and Puri (2013) find that only about 15 percent of the surveyed CEOs and 
CFOs indicate that the CEO is the sole-decision maker in their firms regarding important 
corporate decisions, such as M&A, capital allocation and investments.
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and Gale 2000; Acharya et al. 2011).12 Anticipating this, it is in the best 
interest of the CEO to consider subordinate executives’ interests, motivating 
subordinate executives to work harder (Landier, Sraer, and Thesmar 2009). 
Applying the above general discussion to the real earnings management 
setting, if the CEO chooses real activity manipulation that decreases long-
term firm value, key subordinate executives will choose a lower effort level. 
Anticipating this, the CEO will be less likely to engage in real earnings 
management. In other words, if the CEO does not engage in real earnings 
management, then the subordinate executives’ interest is aligned and they 
will work harder to improve both current and future firm performance. 
In addition, the CEO needs the subordinate executives’ cooperation to 
engage in real earnings management because subordinate executives are 
usually more informed than the CEO in their own functional areas. For 
example, the president in charge of production likely has more information 
about the supply of raw materials and the demand from customers. Hence, 
he or she will play an important role if the firm decides to overproduce in 
order to increase the current period’s earnings. Similarly, the executive in 
charge of R&D is better informed and can influence whether and how much 
the firm can reduce the current period’s R&D. That is, while the CEO has the 
formal authority to make the decision, subordinate executives have the real 
authority, e.g., effective control over the decisions, due to their information 
12 This argument is plausible because an individual’s effort level is usually unobservable and 
subordinate executives have the best information to decide the appropriate effort level. 
(This is the same reason why top executives are given performance-based bonus and stock-
based compensation, not just a fixed salary).
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advantage (Aghion and Tirole 1997). As such, the CEO will have to take the 
subordinate executives’ preferences into consideration.
Overall, the effectiveness of key subordinate executives’ influence in 
curbing myopic behavior depends on their horizon and their ability to 
influence CEOs’ decisions. The longer the horizon and the more influence the
key subordinate executives have, the more effective the internal 
governance, and the less likely that the company will engage in real earnings
management. Thus, our first hypothesis (in alternative form) is as follows: 
H1: The extent of upward real earnings management is negatively 
associated with the effectiveness of internal governance. 
As discussed below, we use key subordinate executives’ horizon (i.e., the 
number of years until retirement) and their relative pay (i.e., the average 
pay of subordinate executives divided by CEO pay) to capture the 
effectiveness of internal governance. 
There are two critical assumptions underlying H1. First, we rely on prior 
research to argue that the CEO has incentives to increase short-term 
performance at the expense of long-term value, such as to increase job 
security (DeFond and Park 1997) and to increase compensation (e.g., Healy 
1985; Cheng and Warfield 2005). One might argue that subordinate 
executives might be as myopic as the CEO. In addition, it is possible that the 
key subordinate executives are in a tournament or competition for the CEO’s
position with external candidates. As a result, they might undertake real 
earnings management to increase short-term earnings and/or to curry favor 
with the CEO who likely plays a role in selecting his/her successor. If this is 
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the case, we will not find results consistent with H1. Second, while prior 
research indicates that key subordinate executives have the ability to 
influence CEOs’ decisions, CEOs have the power to demote or fire these 
subordinate executives. Job security concerns can motivate subordinates to 
cooperate with CEOs in carrying out myopic behavior (Feng et al. 2011). Of 
course, firing key subordinate executives because they do not cooperate in 
myopic behavior can backfire. Having nothing to lose after being fired, 
subordinate executives can become “whistle-blowers” and reveal the 
inappropriate behavior to the board, investors, and the press, or seek legal 
action against the firm for inappropriate dismissal. This potential outcome 
will deter CEOs from freely firing subordinate executives who choose not to 
engage in myopic behavior. Again, if subordinate executives have no 
influence on CEOs’ myopic behavior or if CEOs have no incentive to engage 
in earnings management, we will not find results consistent with H1. Thus, 
whether we find results consistent with H1 is an empirical question. 
Cross-sectional Analyses
To corroborate our theory and main hypothesis that key subordinate 
executives have the ability and incentive to influence the extent of real 
earnings management, we propose several cross-sectional predictions that 
exploit the variation in subordinate executives’ ability and incentive. These 
cross-sectional tests also help rule out competing explanations for the main 
result. 
Variation in subordinate executives’ contribution
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One key assumption underlying H1 is that subordinate executives can 
influence corporate decisions to reflect their preferences. Because one of the
fundamental reasons why key subordinate executives can influence CEOs’ 
decisions is their contribution to firm performance, the greater the 
subordinate executives’ contribution, the greater is their potential influence 
on CEOs (Finkelstein 1992; Acharya et al. 2011). Prior research indicates that
complex firms are more difficult to manage and requires the collective 
efforts of all executives (e.g., Graham et al. 2013). We thus expect the 
impact of internal governance to be stronger in more complex firms than in 
other firms. Our next hypothesis (in alternative form) is as follows:
H2: The effectiveness of internal governance in reducing the extent of 
upward real earnings management is stronger in more complex 
firms than in other firms.
We discuss the proxy for firm complexity in the empirical section. 
Variation in CEO power
Subordinate executives’ ability to influence CEOs’ decision is likely 
affected by how powerful the CEOs are. According to Adams, Almeida, and 
Ferreira (2005), powerful CEOs are those who can consistently influence key 
decisions in their firms, despite the potential opposition from other 
executives. In firms where CEOs are powerful, decision making authority is 
usually centralized in the hands of the CEO and thus these CEOs are able to 
push their agenda even if the decision may be viewed as sub-optimal. 
Consistent with this reasoning, Feng et al. (2011) find that CFOs likely 
succumb to powerful CEOs’ pressure to manipulate financial statements. 
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Therefore, we expect subordinate executives to have lower ability to 
influence CEOs’ decision when CEOs hold substantial power and authority 
within the firm. Conversely, we expect internal governance to be more 
effective in constraining the extent of real earnings management when CEOs
are less powerful, and thus our third hypothesis (in alternative form) is as 
follows: 
H3: The effectiveness of internal governance in reducing the extent of 
upward real earnings management is stronger for firms with less 
powerful CEOs than for other firms.
We discuss the proxy for CEOs’ power in the empirical analysis section. 
Capital markets benefits of meeting or beating earnings 
expectations
In developing the main hypothesis, we argue that subordinate 
executives have incentives to reduce the extent of real earnings 
management because such activities can reduce firm value in the long run. 
However, if such activities can increase firm value in the short run that also 
benefit subordinate executives, they will have weaker incentives to constrain
real earnings management. Prior research documents the capital markets 
benefit of meeting or beating earnings expectations (e.g., Bartov et al. 2002;
Kasznik and McNichols 2002). If the benefit is high enough to outweigh the 
cost of real earnings management, then the effectiveness of internal 
governance is expected to be lower. Firms in financial distress, such as those
with poor credit rating, benefit more from meeting or beating earnings 
benchmarks because missing earnings expectations could lead to credit 
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rating downgrades, inhibiting the firm’s ability in obtaining future financing 
and thus perpetuating financial distress. Consistent with this reasoning, Jiang
(2008) finds that the reduction in the cost of debt from beating earnings 
benchmark is more pronounced for firms with high default risk. Firms which 
habitually meet or beat earnings expectations also benefit more from 
meeting earnings benchmarks because of the additional market premium 
from consistently meeting earnings targets (Kaznik and McNichols 2002). 
Finally, firms that have a forthcoming debt or equity issuance benefit more 
from beating earnings benchmarks, which can increase the proceeds from 
debt/equity financing. Therefore, in instances where the capital markets 
benefit of reporting higher earnings is high, we expect subordinate 
executives to have weaker incentives to constrain real earnings 
management, and thus our last hypothesis (in alternative form) is as follows:
H4: The effectiveness of internal governance in reducing the extent of 
upward real earnings management is weaker for firms with higher 
capital markets benefit of meeting or beating earnings expectations 
than for other firms.
III. RESEARCH DESIGN
Sample
We obtain our initial sample of firms from Compustat ExecuComp in the 
period from 1993 to 2011. We limit our examination to firms with 
compensation details of the top five executives and require at least five 
executives (including the CEO) to be reported in the annual proxy 
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statement.13 To ensure that we have an appropriate measure of CEO’s 
influence within the firm, we require the CEO to be in office for the entire 
year. We exclude firms in financial (2-digit SICs between 60 and 69) and 
utility (2-digit SICs of 49) industries because firms in regulated industries 
have different financial reporting incentives from other firms. We then merge
the sample of executive-level data with Compustat, CRSP, and I/B/E/S to 
obtain the data for the other variables required for the analyses and we drop 
the observations that have missing values for these variables. Our final 
sample consists of 11,994 firm-years, and Panel A of Table 1 reports the 
sample selection process.
Table 1, Panel B reports the job titles of the key subordinate executives 
in our sample firms.14 In our empirical tests, key subordinate executives refer
to the top four non-CEO executives included in the ExecuComp database.15 
The CFO is usually included in the top four executives, with an increased 
frequency in recent years, possibly because of the increasing influence of 
CFOs in the post-SOX era. Other key executives reported in the proxy 
statements usually hold job titles such as Chief Operating Officer (COO), 
President, Executive or Senior Vice President, and Vice President. These titles
13 About 9 percent of firm-year observations in ExecuComp report compensation information 
for fewer than five executives. Following Bebchuk et al. (2011), we exclude these 
observations from our sample to ensure that our measure of key subordinate executives’ 
influence is comparable across firms.
14 Ideally, we would like to categorize the job title of the key subordinate executives based 
on their job function, such as sales, production, and R&D. However, the job titles in 
ExecuComp do not indicate the job scope of the key executives, and many firms categorize 
their job titles by business segments (e.g. subsidiaries), geographical segments or product 
segments rather than by function. As such, we can only provide generic job titles.
15 We limit our scope of subordinate executives to the top four executives other than the 
CEO because most firms only disclose the compensation details of the top five executives 
(including the CEO) in their proxy statements.
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suggest that the key subordinate executives in our sample usually hold very 
important positions and thus have significant responsibilities within the firm, 
leading to their ability to monitor the CEO and to influence real earnings 
management.
Measure of Internal Governance
In this paper, we posit that the effectiveness of internal governance 
increases with key subordinate executives’ incentives and ability to monitor 
the CEO. We measure key subordinate executives’ monitoring incentives 
based on their decision horizon, which we proxy for using the number of 
years until the age of retirement (assumed to be 65):16,17 
Exec_Horizon = 65 – the average age of key subordinate executives
Next, we measure key subordinate executives’ ability to monitor the 
CEO based on their influence within the organization. We posit that 
competitive labor markets dictate the compensation of top executives and 
hence their compensation reflects their contribution to, and their influence 
within, the firm.18 In addition, Finkelstein (1992) argues that an executive’s 
16 We use the horizon of key subordinate executives, not their horizon relative to the CEO’s, 
because it is the horizon itself that leads subordinate executives to care about long-term 
firm value. The difference in horizon does not necessarily capture executives’ incentives to 
increase long-term firm value. For example, in firm A, subordinate executives are on 
average 50 years old and the CEO is 55 years old; in firm B, subordinate executives are on 
average 60 years old and the CEO is 65 years old. While the difference in horizon between 
subordinate executives and the CEO is the same for the two firms, firm A’s subordinate 
executives have longer horizon, arguably care more about the firm’s long-term value, than 
their counterparts in Company B. In the empirical analyses, we include CEO horizon to 
control for its impact on the extent of real earnings management. Nevertheless, we obtain 
qualitatively similar results when using the difference in horizon. 
17 Assuming a different retirement age, such as 70, does not change the regression results 
(except the intercept) because the retirement age is assumed to be a cross-sectional 
constant and is thus just a scalar.
18 Executives’ compensation is also closely related to their outside opportunity wage, which 
is then related to their influence within the firm. An executive with a higher outside 
opportunity wage is more likely to stand by his or her position and is less concerned with the
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compensation reflects her power derived from her structural position in the 
firm. Therefore, our measure of key subordinate executives’ ability to 
monitor the CEO is defined as follows:19
ExecPayRatio=
Averageannual compensationof key subordinateexecutives
CEO’ sannual compensation
We scale the average compensation of key subordinate executives by 
CEO’s annual compensation because we want to capture key subordinate 
executives’ influence within the firm. The level of key executives’ 
compensation varies across firms and does not capture how much influence 
the executives have within the firm. For example, subordinate executives in 
a large firm might erroneously be regarded as having more influence than 
their counterparts in a small firm if one uses the unscaled level of 
compensation as the proxy for their influence within the firm. In an additional
analysis, we use the unscaled abnormal compensation of key subordinate 
executives as an alternative proxy and the inferences remain the same; see 
Section IV for details. 
Finally, we derive an aggregate measure of a firm’s overall internal 
governance effectiveness based on both the incentive and ability of key 
subordinate executives to monitor the CEO. Specifically, we standardize both
Exec_Horizon and Exec_PayRatio and sum the standardized measures as our 
proxy for the firm’s overall internal governance effectiveness 
CEO’s reaction (e.g., being demoted or fired). 
19 Some prior studies use variations of the inverse of this measure, or pay slice, to capture 
tournament incentives (Kale et al. 2009) or CEO entrenchment (Bebchuk et al. 2011; Feng et
al. 2011). We explore alternative proxies below to address the concern that our inferences 
are confounded by these alternative interpretations.
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(Int_Governance).20,21 
Measure of Real Earnings Management
We derive our measure of real earnings management following prior 
studies (Roychowdhury 2006; Cohen and Zarowin 2010). In particular, we 
use three individual metrics, abnormal levels of cash flow from operations 
(RM_CFO), production costs (RM_PROD) and discretionary expenses 
(RM_DISX), and two aggregate metrics (RM1 and RM2) to measure the level 
of real earnings management. These individual measures are the residuals 
from the corresponding estimation model, as described in the Appendix. 
Executives can artificially inflate reported earnings by: 1) accelerating sales 
using aggressive price discounts and/or more lenient credit terms which 
results in abnormally low cash flow from operations (CFO); 2) reducing the 
costs of sales by increasing production so as to spread the fixed costs of 
production over a larger number of units, thereby resulting in abnormally 
high production cost (PROD); 3) reducing the amount of discretionary 
research and development (R&D), advertising, and selling, general and 
administrative (SG&A) expenses which result in abnormally low discretionary
expenses (DISX). Therefore, higher abnormal PROD, lower abnormal CFO, 
20 Specifically, for each of the two variables, we deduct the sample mean and then divide the
difference by the sample standard deviation of the variable. We also explore an alternative 
aggregate measure based on a non-linear combination of Exec_Horizon and Exec_PayRatio 
and obtain quantitatively similar results (untabulated). In particular, we form tercile ranks on
Exec_Horizon and Exec_PayRatio, sum the tercile rank of both variables, and then rescale 
the aggregate measure to lie within zero and one.
21 Note that Int_Governance is not a common factor of Exec_Horizon and Exec_PayRatio; we 
are not assuming that these two variables are highly correlated and capture the common 
underlying construct. Instead, we argue that these two variables capture different 
dimensions of internal governance; executives with long horizon and high pay relative to the
CEO (a high value of Int_Governance) have both the incentive and the ability to monitor 
CEOs compared to their counterparts with short horizon and low pay relative to the CEO (a 
low value of Int_Governance).
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and lower abnormal DISX are consistent with income-increasing real earnings
management. For ease of interpretation, all measures (RM_CFO, RM_PROD, 
and RM_DISX) are defined to be increasing in reported earnings.22
Following Cohen and Zarowin (2010), we define two aggregate 
measures of real earnings management, RM1 and RM2, to capture the total 
amount of real earnings management engaged by the firm in a particular 
fiscal year:23
RM1 = RM_DISX +RM_ PROD
RM2 = RM_CFO + RM_DISX
Empirical Model
Below we describe the research design for the main test of H1. The 
design for other tests is described in the corresponding empirical analysis 
sections. To test H1, we estimate the following regression:
22 Prior research on accruals-based earnings management suggests that discretionary 
accrual models might be mis-specified when applied to firms with extreme financial 
performance (e.g., Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney 1995; Kothari, Leone, and Wasley 2005). A 
similar concern may apply to the real earnings management measures. In an untabulated 
analysis, we use a similar research design as proposed in Kothari et al. (2005) and estimate 
performance-matched real earnings management proxies. We use two alternative 
performance measures, earnings (ROA) and operating cash flow (CFO), because unlike 
accrual earnings management, real earnings management affects both earnings and cash 
flow. Our inferences remain the same. We do not use this approach in the main analyses 
because of smaller sample size due to the requirement of matching firms in the same 
industry-year with ROA/CFO within a narrow bandwidth. Cohen, Pandit, Wasley, and Zach. 
(2011) also note that performance-matched real earnings management measures can 
provide conservative tests that under-reject the null hypotheses relating to income-
increasing real earnings management, which is our economic phenomenon of interest.
23 We do not use an aggregate measure based on all three real earnings management 
proxies because, as suggested in Roychowdhury (2006) and Cohen and Zarowin (2010), 
some activities that lead to abnormally high production costs might also lead to abnormally 
low CFO. Therefore, combining these two measures can result in double counting. In 
addition, we note that the three individual measures capture different types of real earnings 
management. As a result, we do not use a common factor based on these three measures in
the analyses. 
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RMi,t= α  + β Int_Governancei,t-1  + γ CEO_Controlsi,t-1  + ψ Firm_Controlsi,t
+ Industry_FE  + Year_FE + εi,t ,
(1)
where RMi,t is the measure of real earnings management and 
Int_Governancei,t-1 is the measure of a firm’s internal governance strength, as
discussed above. Hypothesis H1 predicts a negative coefficient on 
Int_Governance. CEO_Controlsi,t-1 are the CEO characteristics that are 
included to control for the CEO’s incentives and power in the prior fiscal year;
Firm_Controlsi,t are contemporaneous firm-level control variables; 
Industry_FE and Year_FE are industry and year fixed-effects, respectively.24 
We use the lagged value of all variables relating to internal governance and 
CEO’s characteristics to alleviate the potential endogeneity concern. We also
utilize an instrumental variable approach and a difference-in-differences 
analysis to further mitigate this concern, as discussed in Section IV. 
Appendix A includes the detailed definition of all variables. To mitigate the 
influence of extreme values, all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 
percent and 99 percent levels. Because we use a pooled sample, we use firm
and year clustered standard errors to control for cross-sectional and time-
series dependence in the data (Petersen 2009; Gow, Ormazabal, and Taylor 
2010). 
We include CEO control variables to mitigate the concern that our 
24 Because of the inclusion of industry and year fixed effects, the intercept (α) captures the 
extent of real earnings management for firms in the industry and year that do not have 
corresponding indicators in the regression and when all independent variables have values 
of zero. As such, we do not present the estimates of the intercept in the tables.
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proxies for key subordinate executives’ incentives and ability to monitor the 
CEO merely capture the effect of CEO’s incentives and power on real 
earnings management. Specifically, we include the CEO’s decision horizon 
(CEO_Horizon), proxied for by the number of years until the age of 
retirement (assumed to be 65), the CEO’s annual compensation 
(CEO_Comp), and CEO’s pay-for-performance sensitivity (CEO_PPS), 
measured as the sensitivity of the CEO’s equity portfolio to the firm’s stock 
performance (Core and Guay 2002).
Following prior studies, we include several firm-level control variables to 
capture the impact of firm characteristics on the extent of real earnings 
management. The inclusion of these variables can also help alleviate the 
omitted correlated variable concern arising from potential endogeneity of 
internal governance. Firm age (Firm_Age) is included because younger firms,
which are usually high-growth firms and are expected to obtain additional 
financing in the future, likely face greater capital markets pressure to deliver
and hence are more likely to engage in real earnings management to meet 
earnings targets (Skinner and Sloan 2002; Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew 
2006; Armstrong, Larcker, Ormazabal, and Taylor 2013). We include the 
number of analysts following (N_Analyst) because the monitoring by financial
analysts is likely to constrain real earnings management (Cohen and Zarowin
2010). Lastly, firm performance (ROA), firm size (Size), the book-to-market 
ratio (B/M), and leverage (Leverage) are included as controls for other firm-
specific characteristics such as capital structure and growth opportunities 
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that likely affect real earnings management (Roychowdhury 2006; Cohen 
and Zarowin 2010).25 
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1, Panel C reports descriptive statistics on the regression 
variables. Because the model for real earnings management is estimated 
using the ExecuComp universe and our sample is similarly obtained from 
ExecuComp, the means and medians of the individual real earning 
management proxies are close to zero. The mean (median) decision horizon 
of key subordinate executives (Exec_Horizon) is 12.70 (13.00) years, which is
longer than that of the CEO’s mean (median) decision horizon (CEO_Horizon) 
of 9.50 (10.00) years by 33.7 percent (30.0 percent). This comparison 
supports the notion that key subordinate executives have longer decision 
horizons than the CEO. The mean (median) annual compensation of the key 
subordinate executive relative to that of the CEO is 0.558 (0.436). By 
construction, the summary measure of internal governance, Int_Governance,
has a mean of zero. As our sample firms are from ExecuComp which only 
includes firms from the S&P1500, our sample firms are significantly more 
mature (mean Firm_Age of 22.9 years), have more analysts following (mean 
25 We also control for other variables that might affect the extent of real earnings 
management, such as the G-index, an indicator for CEO-Chairman duality, the pay-for-
performance sensitivity of key subordinate executives, and the squared term of internal 
governance measures. Similarly, we control for several variables that have been used to 
proxy for the cost of real earnings management: market share, Z-score, institutional 
ownership, and marginal tax rate (Zang 2012). The untabulated analyses indicate that the 
results on the variables of interest are qualitatively similar. The G-index and the CEO-
Chairman duality exhibit marginally significant coefficients in some specifications, consistent
with the extent of real earnings management being higher when there are more anti-
takeover measures and when the CEO is more likely to be entrenched. The other 
aforementioned variables are insignificant in most specifications. We omit these controls in 
our main analyses in favor of a more parsimonious empirical model and a larger and more 
generalizable sample. 
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N_Analyst of 11.1 analysts), have better performance (mean ROA of 5.5%), 
and are larger (mean Size, ln(Total assets), of 7.3), as compared to the firms 
covered in the Compustat universe in the same time period.26 The average 
book-to-market ratio is 0.505 and the average leverage is 0.512. 
Table 2 reports the Pearson correlation table of the variables in our main
analysis. The three measures of real earnings management (RM_CFO, 
RM_PROD, and RM_DISX) are highly positively correlated with each other 
except for the correlation between RM_CFO and RM_DISX. These high 
correlations suggest that firms manage one real activity in tandem with 
other real activities. By construction, RM1 and RM2 are highly correlated with
individual components and with each other. The correlation between 
Exec_Horizon and Exec_PayRatio is positive, but the relatively low correlation
coefficient (0.08) suggests that key subordinate executives’ decision horizon 
and influence capture different aspects of firms’ internal governance. 
Consistent with H1, almost all real earnings management measures are 
negatively associated with the proxies of internal governance. None of the 
correlations between control variables are high enough to impose a 
multicollinearity problem.27
26 The average firm in the Compustat universe in the same period is 13.1 years old, is 
followed by 4.4 analysts, has ROA of -0.8% and Size of 5.8. 
27 While internal governance is negatively associated with firm performance and size, we do 
not believe that performance and size drive the documented results. First, we control for 
both firm performance and size in the multiple regression analyses. Second, as mentioned 
above, the inferences remain the same when we use performance-matched real earnings 
management measures. Third, we separately examine the association between internal 
governance and both firm performance and size in the suspect firms and non-suspect firms 
subsample (samples defined below). We find that internal governance is negatively 
associated with firm performance and size for both subsamples. Given that we do not find 
consistent results in the hypothesized direction in the non-suspect sample, as discussed in 
Section IV, the negative association between internal governance and both firm 
performance and size is unlikely to drive the results in suspect firms.
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IV. MAIN ANALYSES – TESTS OF H1
Full sample analysis
In this section, we report our main tests of H1. We first analyze the 
separate impact of executive horizon and pay ratio on the extent of real 
earnings management, and then the impact of the combined internal 
governance measure. Table 3 presents the results. For ease of exposition, all
measures of real earnings management are multiplied by 100.
Table 3, Panel A presents the separate impact of subordinate 
executives’ decision horizon and pay ratio on real earnings management. We
find that as predicted in H1, both executives’ decision horizon and influence 
are significantly negatively associated with the extent of real earnings 
management, whether proxied for by the three individual measures (with the
exception of the association between Exec_Horizon and RM_CFO) or by the 
two summary measures.28 
The results on control variables are generally consistent with prior 
studies. We find some evidence that firms with CEOs that have longer 
horizon are less likely to engage in real earnings management. CEOs with 
higher compensation (which also signifies their ability in the competitive 
28 In an untabulated analysis, we explore the potential non-linearity in the impact of 
executives’ decision horizon on real earnings management by constructing three piece-wise 
linear terms in Exec_horizon, following the approach used in Himmelberg, Hubbard, and 
Palia (1999). We find that when subordinate executives’ horizon is short – less than 5 years, 
there is no impact on the extent of real earnings management. The impact occurs when 
executive horizon is between 5 and 15 years and executive horizon beyond 15 years has no 
incremental effect. This result indicates that executives’ incentive to monitor the CEO is low 
when their horizon is too short (less than 5 years) and does not increase further after 15 
years.
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labor market) are less likely to engage in real earnings management, 
suggesting that better-ability CEOs are associated with better earnings 
quality (Demerjian, Lev, and McVay 2013). We also find that firms with more 
analysts following and better performance are less likely to engage in real 
earnings management and that larger firms and firms with higher book-to-
market and leverage are more likely to engage in real earnings 
management. Finally, there is also evidence that younger firms are more 
likely to engage in real earnings management. 
Table 3, Panel B reports the analysis of the impact of the overall internal
governance on real earnings management. Consistent with the results 
reported above, the overall internal governance (Int_Governance) is 
significantly associated with a lower extent of real earnings management. 
The effect of internal governance on real earnings management is also 
economically significant. A one standard deviation increase in 
Int_Governance is associated with a decrease in RM1 and RM2 of 3.0 percent
and 1.7 percent of total assets, respectively.29 
We conduct a series of additional analyses to ensure the robustness of 
the results and we do not tabulate the results to save space. First, we 
examine whether our results are driven by CFOs’ characteristics. For this 
purpose, we exclude CFOs from our measurement of internal governance. 
The untabulated results are quantitatively similar, suggesting that other key 
29 The impact on RM1 expressed as a percentage of total assets is computed as -2.021 (the 
coefficient on Int_Governance) × 1.468 (the sample standard deviation of Int_Governance). 
Note that all measures of real earnings management are already multiplied by 100 and 
hence presented as a percentage of total assets. The impact on RM2 is computed 
analogously.
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subordinate executives do influence real earnings management. Second, in 
the main analyses, we use the average of executive horizon and pay ratio to 
construct internal governance measures. We find similar results (1) when we 
use the median of key executives’ decision horizon and pay ratio in order to 
mitigate the concern that our results are driven by extreme values in the 
internal governance variables, and (2) when we use the maximum value of 
key executives’ decision horizon and pay ratio (internal governance can 
arguably be exerted by the executive who has the greatest incentive and 
ability to monitor the CEO). 
Overall, the results reported above are consistent with H1 which 
predicts that the extent of real earnings management is negatively 
associated with the effectiveness of internal governance. 
Suspect firms versus non-suspect firms
One drawback of using the full sample to test H1 is that CEOs’ incentives
to engage in earnings management are not salient. To increase our ability to 
detect real earnings management, we focus on firm-years where there is a 
greater likelihood of earnings management – when firms meet or just beat 
important earnings benchmarks (e.g., Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; 
Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser 1999). For this purpose, we follow prior 
research (e.g., Roychowdhury 2006) and limit our sample to firm-years with 
earnings surprise between zero and one percent of share price, where 
earnings surprise is calculated as actual earnings minus the most recent 
consensus analyst forecast before the earnings announcement. We then test
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H1 using this sample of “suspect-firms.” 
Panel A of Table 4 presents the results. We find that internal governance
is negatively correlated with both summary measures of real earnings 
management (t-statistic = -3.83 and -4.37 for RM1 and RM2, respectively). 
The inferences are the same when we examine individual real earnings 
management measures or individual internal governance measures. We do 
not tabulate the results to preserve space.
While Panel A presents the negative effect of internal governance on 
real earnings management, one might wonder whether suspect firms with 
ineffective internal governance indeed manage earnings upward. For this 
purpose, we split the suspect sample into five groups based on the quintile 
of internal governance. We find that for the subsample with internal 
governance in the bottom quintile, the average RM1 (RM2) is 0.017 (0.007), 
significantly different from zero at the 0.01 (0.08) level (untabulated). This 
test indicates that suspect firms with less effective internal governance 
indeed engage in upward real earnings management.  
The arguments underlying H1 imply that we will not find a negative 
association between internal governance and the extent of real earnings 
management in a sample where CEOs have low incentives to engage in 
upward earnings management. Therefore, as a falsification test, we re-run 
our main analyses on a sample where we do not expect earnings 
management and hence internal governance is less likely to matter. 
Specifically, we construct a sample of firm-years with earnings surprises less 
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than -0.5 percent of stock price (big miss) and larger than 1 percent of stock 
price (big beat). We exclude the sample of firm-years with earnings surprises
between -0.5 percent and 0 percent of stock price for two reasons. First, 
given the potential stock price penalty associated with missing analyst 
forecast, it is possible that managers engaged in upward earnings 
management but still failed to meet the benchmark. Second, managers near 
the important earnings benchmark may still manage earnings upwards to 
meet other internal and unobservable targets (Roychowdhury 2006; Zang 
2012). Panel B of Table 4 reports the results using this sample of “non-
suspect” firms. We do not find a significant coefficient on the internal 
governance variable (t-statistic = -1.26 and -0.81 for RM1 and RM2, 
respectively). This result reinforces our inference that internal governance 
plays a more important role in constraining real earnings management when 
the incentives to meet or beat earnings target is high. 
Given that we find the predicted results only for the suspect firms, we 
focus on this sub-sample in the remaining analyses. 
Alternative Measures of Key Subordinate Executives’ Influence
In our earlier analyses, we use the subordinate executives’ 
compensation relative to the CEO’s as a proxy for their influence within the 
firm. However, this measure might also capture other constructs such as 
agency problems (Bebchuk et al. 2011; Feng et al. 2011): a lower ratio of 
subordinate executive pay to CEO pay implies entrenched CEOs. If so, our 
results could be interpreted as less entrenched CEOs (with high executive to 
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CEO pay ratio) engaging in less real earnings management. We do not think 
this alternative explanation is valid because our results are robust to 
controlling for corporate governance variables, as discussed above. To 
further refute this alternative interpretation, we utilize an alternative proxy 
for key subordinate executives’ influence – their abnormal compensation. To 
do so, we follow the compensation model used by Core, Guay, and Larcker 
(2008) and regress the logged total compensation of the subordinate 
executives on economic determinants, including prior year’s logged firm 
sales, S&P 500 membership dummy, prior year’s book-to-market ratio, 
current and prior year’s stock returns, current and prior year’s return on 
assets, and industry and year fixed effects. We use the residual from this 
regression as a proxy for subordinate executives’ abnormal compensation 
(Exec_AbComp). This variable is not based on a comparison with CEO 
compensation and is thus not subject to the alternative interpretation, and 
as usually interpreted in the compensation literature, the abnormal 
compensation captures the executive’s market value. Executives with higher
abnormal compensation are more influential and thus better able to 
constrain the extent of earnings management. 
Table 5, Panel A reports the regression results based on this variable in 
instead of Exec_Payratio in Equation (1). As observed from columns (1) to 
(4), our results are robust to using this alternative proxy for subordinate 
executives’ influence, either as a stand-alone measure or in the combined 
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internal governance measure with executive horizon.30
In addition, throughout the paper, we use the compensation-based 
measure to capture key executives’ influence within the firm. In an additional
analysis, we explore an alternative measure of key subordinate executives’ 
influence: the number of directorships in other firms held by these 
executives (Other_Director). Finkelstein (1992) argue that sitting on other 
firms’ boards reflects an executive’s power. Masulis and Mobbs (2011) also 
argue that these executives are more influential and are more likely to be 
the CEO in the future. Based on these findings, we expect that the key 
subordinate executives who have directorships in other firms to exert 
greater influence over the current CEO and that the more directorships they 
have, the stronger their influence. To test this prediction, we add this 
alternative measure of key executives’ power to Equation (1) and report the 
results in Table 5, Panel B. In our sample, 8.0 percent of firm-year 
observations have at least one key executive holding directorship(s) in other 
firms.31 
In columns (1) and (2), we use Other_Director in place of Exec_PayRatio 
as an alternative proxy for key subordinate executives’ influence. As 
predicted, we find that Other_Director is negatively associated with RM1 and 
RM2, significant at the 0.01 level in both models (t-statistic = -2.44 and -
30 In another untabulated sensitivity test, we use firms’ total asset as the deflator when 
calculating executive pay ratio which avoids using CEO pay as the denominator of the pay 
ratio. Our inferences also remain the same.
31 Within the group of firms with key subordinate executives serving as directors in other 
firms, 66 percent (23 percent, 11 percent) of the firms have one (two, three or more) key 
subordinate executive serving as directors in other firms.
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2.55, respectively). This result suggests that key subordinate executives with
outside directorships exert greater influence in constraining real earnings 
management. In columns (3) and (4), we explore whether Other_Director 
captures a different dimension of executives’ influence than Exec_PayRatio 
by including both variables in the same regression. We find that both 
variables have significantly negative coefficients, suggesting that 
Other_Director represents a different aspect of executives’ influence within 
the firm. 
In sum, our results reported above are not due to the alternative 
explanation based on CEO entrenchment or agency problems, and our 
results hold when using alternative measures of subordinate executives' 
influence.
Addressing Endogeneity Concerns
We recognize that our analyses might be subject to endogeneity 
concerns because firms’ internal governance is arguably endogenously 
determined and the determinants of the internal governance might also 
affect the extent of real earnings management. For example, some of the 
firms that are conscientious about real earnings management might select 
young and powerful subordinate executives to balance the influence of the 
CEO and these firms might also have lower extent of earnings management 
for other reasons (such as having a strong board of directors). For another 
example, unobservable subordinate executive talent might affect both 
measures; talented subordinate executives are likely paid more, leading to 
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higher value of the measured executive pay ratio, and are given more 
discretion in undertaking discretionary investments. We do not believe that 
these alternative arguments can explain our results. 
First, theoretically, the potential omitted correlated variable, such as 
talent, likely affect subordinate executives and CEOs similarly. For example, 
under the alternative argument based on executive talent, if the board is 
willing to award more talented subordinate executives higher compensation 
and more discretion, they should be willing to do the same for the CEO. That 
is, the board will give more talented CEOs higher compensation and more 
discretion. This implies that in the absence of CEO entrenchment, firms with 
highly paid CEOs will be less likely to cut discretionary expenditures, leading 
to lower executive pay ratio and lower extent of real earnings management, 
i.e., a positive association between the two. This prediction is opposite to 
what H1 predicts and what we find above. Second, as highlighted earlier, we 
mitigate this concern by using the lagged values of internal governance and 
include a comprehensive list of control variables that are likely correlated 
with both internal governance and the extent of real earnings management 
in the main analyses or robustness checks, including corporate governance 
variables. Third, some of our cross-sectional analyses also mitigate this 
concern because it is arguably harder for an omitted correlated variable to 
explain both our main and cross-sectional findings.32 Lastly, as discussed 
32 For example, it is difficult to argue why executive talent plays a less important role for 
firms that are expected to benefit more from meeting or just beating earnings targets (see 
the development of H4 in Section II). There is no compelling reason to believe that the 
capital market benefit of meeting or just beating earnings targets to the firm should vary 
with the talent of the subordinate executives.
40
above, we do not find consistent results for non-suspect firms. If omitted 
correlated variables drive the results, we should expect to find similar results
in non-suspect firms as well. 
Nevertheless, in this section we use two approaches, an instrumental 
variable approach and a difference-in-differences analysis, to further address
the endogeneity concerns.
An Instrumental Variable Approach 
In this section, we employ a two-stage least square instrumental 
variable approach to further address endogeneity concerns, as commonly 
used in the literature. In the first stage regression, we regress internal 
governance on the instrument variables and in the second stage, we use the 
predicted internal governance to explain the extent of real earnings 
management. For this purpose, we utilize four instruments: 1) the one-year 
lagged value of internal governance (Lagged_Int_Governance);33 2) the 
industry-year median value of internal governance (Ind-Year-
Median_Int_Governance); 3) an indicator variable, Outside_CEO, that equals 
one if the current CEO is recruited from outside, and zero otherwise; and 4) 
the number of named executives in the annual proxy statement besides the 
CEO (Named_Exec). For the first two instruments, we follow prior studies 
(e.g., Coles et al. 2006; Boone et al. 2007; Kale et al. 2009) and use the 
lagged endogenous variable and the industry-year median endogenous 
variable as instruments, based on the reasoning that firm-specific 
33 Recall that our measures of internal governance are lagged one year in all our empirical 
specifications. Therefore, this instrument is lagged two years relative to our outcome 
variable. 
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governance practice that persists over time is more likely to be exogenous to
the current year’s decision (e.g., the extent of real earnings management 
engaged to meet the current year’s short-term earnings targets) and that 
industry-specific governance characteristic are more likely exogenous 
because they are not under the firm’s control in any particular year. The 
choice of the latter two instruments is based on related prior studies that 
utilize similar instruments (e.g., Kale et al. 2009; Bebchuk et al. 2011). Based
on these studies, we argue that when the CEO is recruited from outside, the 
CEO is less likely to possess as much firm-specific knowledge as an inside-
CEO and the influence of other executives is likely higher, improving the 
effectiveness of internal governance. In a similar vein, having a higher 
number of named executives in the annual proxy statement implies a 
greater number of highly-paid executives and a stronger presence of 
divisional managers who can arguably increase the effectiveness of internal 
governance. However, we are not aware of any prior research suggesting 
that having an outside CEO or the number of divisional managers is 
associated with the extent of real earnings management. As discussed 
below, we conduct the tests suggested by Larcker and Rusticus (2010) and 
find that these four instruments are relevant and valid. 
We report the first stage regression results in Column (1) of Table 6, 
where we regress Int_Governance on all four instruments as well as the 
controls used in the second stage regression. As predicted, we find that the 
instrument variables are significantly positively associated with 
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Int_Governance with the exception of Named_Exec (t-statistic = 27.46, 9.70, 
2.75, and 0.90, respectively). The weak identification test suggests that 
these four instruments are relevant and powerful: the F statistic for the joint 
explanatory power of the instrument variables is 303.29, significantly higher 
than the critical value of 13.96, as suggested in Stock, Wright, and Yogo 
(2002).   
Columns (2) and (3) of Table 6 report the second stage regression 
results. We find that predicted internal governance estimated from the first-
stage regression is significant and negatively associated with RM1 and RM2 
(t-statistic = -3.35 and -4.32, respectively). The result from the over-
identification test of all instruments is insignificant (J-statistic = 5.197 and 
5.499 for the two columns, respectively), suggesting that the instruments 
are valid in the second stage regression.34 
A Difference-in-differences Analysis
As an alternative approach to address endogeneity concerns, we 
conduct a difference-in-differences (DID) analysis. If the omitted correlated 
variables that affect both internal governance and the extent of real earnings
management are time-invariant, they are controlled for in the DID analysis. 
Because the year-on-year change in executive horizon is 1 by construction 
and executive pay ratio is relatively sticky over time, we examine the change
in one of the alternative measures of internal governance – key subordinate 
34 In an additional robustness test, we follow Larcker and Rusticus’s (2010) recommendation 
and conduct sensitivity analyses on the choice of instruments, and all the 2SLS test statistics
are robust to using various subsets of the four instruments such as: 1) lagged and industry-
year median internal governance and Outside_CEO; 2) lagged and industry-year median 
internal governance; 3) Outside_CEO and Named_Exec.
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executives serving on other firms’ boards. In particular, we utilize a DID 
research design, as in Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) and Chan, Chen, 
Chen, and Yu (2012), and examine the impact on real earnings management 
of the new appointment of key executives as independent directors on other 
firm’s boards. We construct two variables: 1) an indicator variable 
(CID_FIRM ) that equals one if the firm has at least one key executive who 
holds independent directorships in other firms during the sample period, and 
zero otherwise; 2) an indicator variable (POST_CID_FIRM ) that equals one for
firm-years after the first key executive is appointed as an independent 
director in other firms, and zero otherwise.35 The coefficient on CID_FIRM 
captures the difference in real earnings management between firms with key
subordinate executives being externally appointed as independent directors 
(i.e., treatment firm) and the other firms in the pre-appointment period. The 
coefficient on POST_CID_FIRM captures the incremental effect of CID_FIRM on
real earnings management after the appointment of key executives as 
external independent director.36 We do not include a separate variable for 
the post-appointment period as it is subsumed by the year fixed effects. 
(POST_CID_FIRM  is essentially the interaction between the CID_FIRM and an 
indicator for the post-appointment period.) 
Table 7 presents the result from this analysis. We observe a significant 
35 There are only very few firms with two or more subordinate executives concurrently 
serving as independent directors on other firms’ boards. 
36 We exclude firm-years where the treatment firm becomes a non-treatment firm to have a 
cleaner set of treatment firms. In unreported analyses, our results are similar if we include 
these excluded firm-years in the analyses. In another robustness test, we restrict the 
treatment sample to firms with at least two pre-appointment years and at least two post-
appointment years. Our inferences remain the same.
44
decrease in the extent of real earnings management after the appointment 
of the first key executive as independent directors in other firms; the 
coefficient on POST_CID_FIRM is significantly different from zero (t-statistic = 
-2.42 and -2.75, respectively).37 This result indicates that key subordinate 
executives have a causal effect on the extent of real earnings management 
after their appointment as independent directors in other firms, presumably 
as a result of the increase in their standing and influence within their own 
firms. 
Overall, the robust results based on the instrumental variable approach 
and the DID analysis strengthen our earlier inference that key executives 
exercise significant influence over real earnings management, mitigating 
concerns that our results are driven by omitted correlated variables.
V. CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSES
Research Design 
To test H2-H4, we estimate the following regression:
RMi,t= α  + β Int_Governancei,t-1+η Conditioning_VARi,t   
+ ϕ Int_Governancei,t-1×Conditioning_VARi,t + γ CEO_Controlsi,t-1
+ ψ Firm_Controlsi,t  + Industry_FE  + Year_FE + εi,t , (2)
where Conditioning_VARi,t is a conditioning variable that moderates the 
association between a firm’s internal governance effectiveness and real 
earnings management. All other variables are defined as above. To preserve 
37 We also find that the coefficient on CID_FIRM is insignificantly different from zero; that is, 
there is no significant difference in the extent of real earnings management in the pre-
appointment period between firms that have executives being appointed as external 
independent directors and those without.
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space, we focus on the two aggregate measures of real earnings 
management (RM1 and RM2) and the aggregate measure of the firm’s 
internal governance (Int_Governance). The estimation of regression (2) is 
similar to that of regression (1). To test H2, H3, and H4, Conditioning_VARi,t 
refers to proxies for key subordinate executives’ contribution to the firm’s 
performance, proxies for CEO power, and proxies for the benefit of meeting 
or beating earnings benchmarks, respectively. We explain the proxies below 
in the corresponding sections. 
The Conditioning Effect of Firm Complexity – Test of H2
To test H2, we examine whether the effectiveness of internal 
governance in constraining real earnings management is stronger in firms 
where key subordinate executives’ contribution to the firm’s performance is 
expected to be higher. We expect key subordinate executives’ contribution 
to the firm’s performance to be more important when the firm operates in an
R&D intensive industry where technological complexity is high and when the 
complexity surrounding operating in diverse geographical locations is high 
(e.g., Finkelstein 1992; Graham et al. 2013). We proxy for operation 
complexity using the following two measures: (1) an indicator for high R&D 
intensity (IND_RD), which equals one (zero) if the average R&D intensity in 
the industry-year is above (below) the sample median; and (2) an indicator 
for high geographical complexity (GEO_Complexy), which equals one (zero) 
for firm-year observations with above (below) the median first principle 
component of the following three variables: the number of geographical 
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segments, geographical sales concentration, and the percentage of foreign 
sales.38 To test H2, we replace Conditioning_VARi,t in Equation (2) with each of
the two measures and we expect a negative coefficient on the interaction 
term.
Table 8 reports the regression results. We find the association between 
internal governance and the extent of real earnings management is 
significantly more negative for firms in industries with higher R&D intensity 
(Panel A, t-statistic = -2.58 and -2.90, respectively) and for firms with more 
diverse geographical operations (Panel B, t-statistic = -1.63 and -2.00, 
respectively). Overall, the results in Table 8 are consistent with hypothesis 
H2 that the impact of internal governance is stronger in more complex firms 
where key subordinate executives are expected to play a more important 
role in the firm’s operations.
The Conditioning Effect of CEO Power – Test of H3
H3 predicts that the effectiveness of internal governance is higher when 
CEOs are less powerful. We measure CEO power using three proxies. The 
first two measures are based on two commonly studied governance 
mechanisms: the monitoring by the board of directors and by institutional 
shareholders. We expect CEOs to be less powerful when other strong 
governance mechanisms are in place. Prior research documents that the 
effectiveness of board monitoring increases with board independence (e.g., 
Weisbach 1988; Klein 2002) and that institutional investors are better 
38 We do not combine IND_RD and GEO_Complexy into one common factor because 
unreported factor analysis results in two principle components with an eigenvalue greater 
than one, suggesting that these two measures appear to capture different constructs.
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monitors than other shareholders (e.g., Bushee 1998; Parrino, Sias, and 
Starks 2003; Chen, Harford, and Li 2007). Thus, we predict that the 
effectiveness of internal governance increases with board independence and 
institutional ownership, and we construct indicator variables that equal one 
(zero) if board independence (BD_IND) and institutional ownership 
(Inst_Own) are above (below) the corresponding sample median.39 The third 
proxy is based on CEO’s tenure and whether he is recruited from outside. We
expect a CEO who is recently recruited from outside to be less experienced 
on his new position and thus less powerful. Hence, we create an indicator 
variable (New_OutsideCEO) that equals one if the CEO is recruited from 
outside and the CEO’s tenure is less than three years, and zero otherwise.40,
41 To test H3, we replace Conditioning_VARi,t with one of these three proxies 
and we expect a negative coefficient on the interaction term in Equation (2).
Table 9 presents the regression results. We find that the effectiveness of
internal governance in constraining the extent of real earnings management 
is higher in firms with higher board independence (Panel A, t-statistic = -1.55
and -2.38, respectively), in firms with higher institutional ownership (Panel B,
t-statistic = -1.58 and -1.52, respectively), and in firms with newly appointed 
outside CEOs (Panel C, t-statistic = -3.21 and -2.50, respectively). These 
39 While the monitoring by the board of directors and institutional investors is probably the 
most commonly examined dimensions of corporate governance, there are other dimensions 
of corporate governance. Examining all possible dimensions of corporate governance is 
beyond the scope of this paper.
40 We do not focus on CEO tenure solely because a newly-appointed CEO could have worked 
within the firm for many years and thus would be very experienced and knowledgeable 
about his new position. Therefore these CEOs are arguably powerful. 
41 Results are qualitatively similar when we use different tenure cutoffs around 3, such as 2.5
years or 3.5 years.
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results are consistent with hypothesis H3 that internal governance is more 
effective when CEOs are less powerful and that effective board oversight and
higher institutional ownership can enhance key subordinate executives’ 
ability to monitor the CEO.42 
The Conditioning Effect of the Capital Markets Benefit of Meeting or 
Beating Earnings Targets – Test of H4
Finally, we examine whether subordinate executives’ incentives to 
constrain real earnings management vary with the capital markets benefit of
meeting or beating earnings targets. We expect subordinate executives to 
have weaker incentives to constrain real earnings management when the 
capital markets benefit of reporting higher earnings is high because they will 
enjoy the benefit as well. We proxy for the benefits of reporting higher 
earnings using three measures: (1) an indicator variable (Distress) that 
equals one if the Z-score of the firm is lower than 1.81 and the bond rating of
the firm is below the investment grade, and zero otherwise; (2) an indicator 
variable (Hab_Beater) that equals one if the firm is a habitual beater (i.e., 
meeting or beating at least three out of the last four quarters, and at least 
six out of the last eight quarters), and zero otherwise; and (3) an indicator 
variable (Capital_Issue) that equals one if the firm has significant financing 
activities (i.e., issuing debt or equity greater than or equal to three percent 
42 This finding is also consistent with Acharya et al. (2011, 691) who analytically show that “a
combination of internal governance and a rudimentary form of outside governance by 
shareholders can improve the efficiency of the firm dramatically.” By “rudimentary form of 
outside governance by shareholders,” they refer to shareholders’ ability to take over the 
firm and replace the CEO if necessary. That is, the effectiveness of internal governance can 
be enhanced by the monitoring by shareholders who care about long-term value and have 
the ability to discipline the CEO if needed.
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of market value) in the following fiscal year, and zero otherwise.43 We expect 
the benefits of reporting higher earnings to be higher for firms with poor 
credit rating, for firms that are habitual benchmark beaters, and for firms 
with forthcoming financing activities, and hence we expect a positive 
coefficient on the interaction term in Equation (2). 
Table 10 presents the regression results. Consistent with H4, we find 
that internal governance is less effective in constraining real earnings 
management for firms in financial distress (Panel A, t-statistic = 1.90 and 
2.22, respectively), for firms that are habitual beaters (Panel B, t-statistic = 
1.95 and 1.58, respectively), and for firms with future financing activities 
(Panel C, t-statistic = 1.07 and 1.42, respectively). Overall, the results are 
consistent with hypothesis H4 that subordinate executives have weaker 
incentives to constrain real earnings management when the capital markets 
benefit to reporting higher earnings is greater.
VI. ADDITIONAL ANALYSES AND SENSITIVITY CHECKS
The Effectiveness of Internal Governance: Pre- versus Post-SOX 
Period
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (hereafter, “SOX”), passed on July 30, 2002, 
aims at strengthening corporate governance and mitigating managerial 
incentives to manipulate earnings via accruals. Prior research (e.g., Graham 
43 We use a relatively high cutoff of three percent of market value to classify debt or equity 
issuance so that we can focus on instances where the benefits of reporting higher earnings 
are greater as well as to prevent misclassification of debt and equity issuance (e.g., issuing 
equity for employee stock options plans, debt conversion). Our results are robust to using 
other cutoffs between two percent to five percent of market value.
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et al. 2005; Cohen et al. 2008) finds that the passage of SOX and the 
increased regulatory scrutiny on accrual-based earnings management led 
many firms to switch from accrual to real earnings management. When CEOs
switch to value-decreasing real activities manipulations, we expect key 
subordinate executives to exert more influence over real earnings 
management in the post-SOX period than in the pre-SOX period. In addition, 
the passage of SOX increases the overall emphasis on corporate governance.
Hence, key subordinate executives are likely to obtain greater support from 
other governance mechanisms, such as the board of directors, in the 
monitoring of the CEO, also leading to more effective internal governance. 
Note that as shown in Section V, internal governance and other governance 
mechanisms work as complements, rather than substitutes. As such, SOX 
represents an exogenous shock that affects the effectiveness of internal 
governance in reducing the extent of real earnings management: both the 
effectiveness of internal governance and the extent of real earnings 
management are increased, and we should observe stronger results in the 
post-SOX period. In contrast, if the results documented above are driven by 
endogenous (or optimal) decision of the firm, we should not observe any 
change in the effectiveness of internal governance. 
To test this prediction, we create an indicator variable (Post_SOX) that 
equals one if the fiscal year is after 2003, and zero otherwise, and replace 
Conditioning_VAR in Equation (2) with Post_SOX.44 Because of the inclusion of
44 We do not include observations in 2002 and 2003 in the post-SOX period because these 
two years are regarded as a transition period when many sections of SOX were not yet fully 
effective. The results are quantitatively similar if we include 2002 and 2003 in the post-SOX 
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the Post_SOX variable, we cannot include year fixed-effects; instead we 
include a time trend variable (Time), which is fiscal year minus 1993, the first
fiscal year of the sample. The results are presented in Table 11. Consistent 
with our predictions, the coefficient on the interaction term is significantly 
negative (t-statistic = -2.29 and -2.76, respectively), implying that the 
effectiveness of internal governance in constraining real earnings 
management is strengthened in the post-SOX period. 
Self-Serving CEOs
An implicit assumption in our hypothesis is that the CEO has private 
incentives to increase short-term performance at the expense of long-term 
value. This assumption is based on the findings in prior research. However, 
not all CEOs are the same and our results should be stronger in cases where 
the CEOs are particularly self-serving because subordinate executives have 
stronger incentives to constrain real earnings management when the CEOs 
are perceived to be more self-serving. In this section, we explore a setting 
where CEOs are more likely to be self-serving. For this purpose, we rely on 
prior literature to identify instances where CEOs have greater career 
concerns and thus stronger incentives to manage earnings to report better 
financial performance. Parrino (1997) shows that it is easier to identify and 
replace poorly performing CEOs in homogeneous industries. Similarly, 
DeFond and Park (1999) show that market competition is likely to enhance 
the importance of accounting earnings in relative performance evaluation, 
and indeed they find that accounting-based measures are more associated 
period.
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with CEO turnover in industries with high competition. Following these 
arguments, we predict that CEOs in homogenous and competitive industries 
are more self-serving and have greater incentives to manage earnings for 
job security consideration.45 As such, internal governance is more effective 
for firms in such industries. To test our prediction, we create an indicator 
variable (Self_Serving_CEO) that equals one (zero) if the firm is in the more 
homogenous and competitive industries, which are classified based on the 
sample median of the first principle component of the industry homogeneity 
measure used in Parrino (1997) and the inverse of industry sales 
concentration ratio. 
Table 12 presents the regression results. As reported in this table, we 
find that consistent with our prediction, the negative effect of internal 
governance on real earning management is stronger in more homogenous 
and competitive industries (t-statistic = -4.09 and -3.94, respectively).
The impact of internal governance when CEOs have incentives to 
engage in downward earnings management
To triangulate our results, we identify a situation where CEOs have 
incentives to engage in downward earnings management and then test 
whether internal governance plays a less important role in constraining 
earnings management. The argument underlying H1 is that strong internal 
governance reduces upward real earnings management because such 
manipulation reduces long-term firm value. Presumably, if downward real 
45 On the other hand, Giroud and Mueller (2010) find that managerial slack is lower in 
competitive industries, which suggests that market competition improves firm governance 
and thus mitigates managerial self-serving behavior.
53
earnings management does not have an adverse impact on long-term firm 
value, subordinate executives will not restrain the extent of real earnings 
management. It thus follows that internal governance plays a less important 
role in situation where CEOs have incentives to report lower earnings. 
Following prior research (e.g., McAnally et al. 2008), we use forthcoming 
fixed-date option grants to capture CEOs’ incentives to engage in downward 
earnings management. McAnally et al. (2008) find that CEOs have incentives
to miss earnings targets prior to fixed-date option grants, because CEOs 
profit from a reduced option strike price if the firm’s stock price decreases 
after missing earnings targets.46 Following McAnally et al. (2008), we create 
an indicator variable (Future_Option_Grant) that equals one if the one-year 
ahead fixed-date option grants scaled by salary after the earnings 
announcement is greater than the sample median and the firm misses 
analyst forecast by a small margin (less than 0.5 percent of stock price) or a 
really large margin (more than 10 percent of stock price), and zero 
otherwise.47 We predict the negative effect of internal governance to be 
weaker, or the coefficient on the interaction term of internal governance and 
Future_Option_Grant to be positive. 
Table 13 presents the regression results. As predicted, we find that the 
negative effect of internal governance on real earning management is 
significantly attenuated when CEOs have large forthcoming fixed-date option
46 We focus on fixed-date option grants because the grant dates of these options are known 
and thus managers cannot time or backdate the options (McAnally et al. 2008).
47 Because we are interested in the firms where managers have the incentives to manage 
earnings downward and benefit from missing earnings targets (i.e., reduction in option strike
price prior to option grants), we examine the full sample in this set of analysis. 
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grants (t-statistic = 2.05 and 2.12, respectively). Moreover, the F-test 
indicates that the net effect of internal governance (β1 + β2) is insignificant; 
that is, internal governance is not associated with the extent of real earnings
management for the firms with large forthcoming fixed-date option grants. 
These results corroborate our evidence that internal governance only plays 
an important role in constraining upward earnings management.  
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we examine whether key subordinate executives have the 
incentive and ability to constrain the extent of real earnings management. 
Compared to the CEO, key subordinate executives are usually younger, have
longer horizon, and care more about future performance. Also, key 
subordinate executives have the ability to influence CEOs’ decisions because
of their significant involvement in the firm’s operations as well as their 
contribution to the firm’s current performance, which are important to the 
CEO. Using the number of years to retirement to capture key subordinate 
executives’ incentives and their compensation relative to the CEO’s to 
capture their influence within the firm, we find that the extent of real 
earnings management decreases with key subordinate executives’ horizon 
and influence. Our results are robust to alternative measures of key 
subordinate executives’ ability to influence corporate decisions: the 
abnormal compensation of subordinate executives and the number of 
directorships in other firms held by these executives. Our inferences also 
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remain the same after we control for potential endogeneity concerns using 
an instrumental variable approach and a difference-in-differences approach.
We then examine whether the impact of internal governance varies with
proxies for key subordinate executives’ contribution, proxies for CEO power, 
and proxies for capital markets benefit of meeting earnings benchmarks. We 
find that the effect of internal governance is stronger in more complex firms 
where key subordinate executives play a more important role, stronger in 
firms where the CEO is less powerful, and weaker in firms where the capital 
markets benefit of meeting earnings benchmark is higher. We conduct a 
series of additional tests to ensure the robustness of our results and to 
provide additional insights. First, we find that our results are stronger in the 
post-SOX period when real earnings management is likely more prevalent 
than in the pre-SOX period. Second, we find that internal governance is more
effective in constraining real earnings management for firms where CEOs 
presumably have greater career concerns and thus have more incentives to 
manage earnings to report a better financial performance. Lastly, we find 
that the effect of internal governance is weaker for firms with large 
forthcoming fixed-date option grants, where CEOs presumably have 
incentives to manage earnings downward to reduce the exercise price of the 
option grants. 
We contribute to the literature by examining the impact of internal 
governance on the extent of real earnings management. This examination is 
important because it sheds light on how the members of the management 
56
team work together to shape financial reporting. Unlike prior research that 
generally views executives as a unified team, this paper provides evidence 
that subordinate executives can provide an important monitoring role on the 
CEOs from the bottom up and that effective internal governance can reduce 
the extent of real earnings management. This paper differs from and 
complements studies on the impact of CFO characteristics on accrual quality 
or the likelihood of earnings restatements/frauds by focusing on all 
subordinate executives and by focusing on real earnings management. 
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APPENDIX
Variables Definition
BD_IND An indicator variable that equals one (zero) if the firm-year
observation  is  above  (below)  the  median  percentage  of
independent director.
B/M The book to market ratio in the current fiscal year, defined
as book value of equity (CEQ) divided by the market value
of equity (CSHO*PRCC_F).
Capital_Issue An indicator variable that equals one if the firm issues debt
or equity greater than or equals three percent of market
value in the following fiscal year, and zero otherwise.  
CEO_Comp The  CEO’s  logged  total  compensation  in  the  prior  fiscal
year.
CEO_Horizon CEO’s  decision  horizon,  defined as  retirement  age of  65
minus the age of the CEO.
CEO_PPS The  normalized  pay-for-performance  sensitivity  of  the
CEO’s portfolio of equity in the prior fiscal year, measured
similarly to Core and Guay (2002).
CID_FIRM An indicator variable that equals one if the firm has at least
one key executive that serves as an independent director
on other firms’ boards during the sample period, and zero
otherwise.
POST_CID_FIRM An indicator variable that equals one for firm-years after
the key executive is appointed as an independent director
in other firms, and zero otherwise.
Distress An indicator variable that equals one if the Z-score of the
firm is less than 1.81 and the bond rating of the firm is
below investment grade, and zero otherwise.
Exec_Abcomp Subordinate  executives’  abnormal  compensation,
calculated as the logged (1 + abnormal compensation +
sample  minimum  abnormal  compensation),  where
abnormal compensation is the residual from a regression of
executives’  mean  total  compensation  on  known
determinants  of  CEO  Pay  (logged  sales,  S&P500
membership, book-to-market, returns and lagged returns,
ROA and lagged ROA, and industry and year fixed effects).
Exec_Horizon Subordinate  executives’  decision  horizon,  defined  as
retirement  age  of  65  minus  the  average  age  of  other
executives.
Exec_PayRatio Subordinate  executives’  pay  ratio,  calculated  as  the
average  total  compensation  of  subordinate  executives
scaled by the CEO’s total compensation, measured in the
prior fiscal year.
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Firm_Age The age of the firm, defined as the number of years since
the  firm’s  stock  returns  is  first  reported  in  the  monthly
stock files of CRSP.
Future_Option_ An indicator that equals one if the one-year ahead fixed-
date option grant 
Grant scaled  by  salary  after  the  earnings  announcement  is
greater  than  the  sample  median  and  the  firm  misses
analyst forecast by a small margin (less than 0.5 percent of
stock price) or a large margin (more than 10 percent of
stock price), and zero otherwise.
GEO_Complexy An indicator variable that equals one (zero) if the firm-year
observation  is  above  (below)  the  median  first  principle
component of the following three variables: 1) number of
geographical  segments;  2)  geographical  sales
concentration and; 3) percentage of foreign sales.
Hab_Beater An indicator variable that equals one if the firm meets or
beats earnings targets at least three out of the last four
quarters, and at least six out of the last eight quarters, and
zero otherwise.
IND_RD An indicator variable that equals one (zero) if the average
R&D intensity  in  the  industry-year  is  above  (below)  the
sample median.
Ind-Year-Median_ The industry-year median value of internal governance.
Int_Governance
Inst_Own An indicator variable that equals one (zero) if the firm-year
observation  is  above  (below)  the  median  institutional
ownership.
Int_Governance Firm’s overall internal governance, measured as the sum of
the standardized value of Exec_Horizon and Exec_PayRatio.
Lagged_Int_ The one-year lagged value of internal governance.
Governance
Leverage The leverage ratio  in  the  current  fiscal  year,  defined as
total liabilities (AT – CEQ) divided by total assets (AT).
N_Analyst The number of analysts following the firm in the current
fiscal year, obtained from I/B/E/S.
Named_Exec The  number  of  named  executives  in  the  annual  proxy
statement besides the CEO in the prior fiscal year.
New_OutsideCEO An indicator equals one if the CEO is recruited from outside
and  the  CEO’s  tenure  is  less  than  three  years,  zero
otherwise.
Other_Director The  number  of  independent  directorships  in  other  firms
held by key subordinate executives.
Outside_CEO An indicator variable that equals one if the current CEO is
recruited from outside, and zero otherwise.
Post_SOX An indicator variable that equals one if fiscal year is 2002
and onward, and zero otherwise.
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RM_CFO Negative of the residual from the cash flow from operations
(CFO) model:
CFOit
Assets it−1
=α1
1
Assets it−1
+α2
SALESit
Assets it−1
+α3
Δ SALESit
Assets it−1
+εit
The model is estimated by industry (at the Fama-French 48
industry level) and year and requires at least ten 
observations for each industry-year combination, using 
firms from the ExecuComp universe.
RM_DISX Negative of the residual from the discretionary expenses
(DISX) model:
DISX it
Assets it−1
=α1
1
Assets it−1
+α2
SALESit
Assets it−1
+α3
Δ SALESit
Assets it−1
+εit
The model is estimated by industry (at the Fama-French 48
industry  level)  and  year  and  requires  at  least  ten
observations  for  each  industry-year  combination,  using
firms from the ExecuComp universe.
RM_PROD The residual from production Costs (PROD) model:
∏ ¿it
Assets it−1
=α1
1
Assets it−1
+α2
SALESit
Assets it−1
+α3
Δ SALESit
Assets it−1
+α4
ΔSALES it−1
Assets it−1
+εit ¿
PROD is defined as the sum of the cost of goods sold 
(COGS) and the change in inventory (ΔINVT). The model is 
estimated by industry (at the Fama-French 48 industry 
level) and year and requires at least ten observations for 
each industry-year combination, using firms from the 
ExecuComp universe.
RM1 An  aggregate  measure  of  real  earnings  management,
defined as the sum of RM_PROD and RM_DISX.
RM2 An  aggregate  measure  of  real  earnings  management,
defined as the sum of RM_CFO and RM_DISX.
ROA Return  on  assets  in  the  current  fiscal  year,  defined  as
earnings  before  extraordinary  items  (IB),  scaled  by
beginning total assets (AT).
Self_Serving_CEO An indicator variable that equals one (zero) if the firm-year
observation  is  above  (below)  the  median  first  principle
component  of  the  following  two  variables:  1)  industry
homogeneity  based  on  Parrino  (1997)  and;  2)  industry
competition  based  on  the  inverse  of  industry  sales
concentration ratio.
Size Firm size,  calculated as the logged value of  total  assets
(AT) in the current fiscal year.
Time A time trend variable which equals the difference between
the current fiscal year and 1993.
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 TABLE 1
Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Sample Selection
Obs.
Total number of firm-year observations from 1993-2011 
with Compustat, Execucomp and I/B/E/S data 23,647 
Less: financials and utilities firms (5,133)
Less: missing values for variables used in the regressions (6,520)
Final sample 11,994 
Number of unique firms 2,005 
Panel B: Titles of Key Subordinate Executives
Title Obs.   %
Chief Financial Officer (CFO) 9,556 19.92 
Chief Operating Officer (COO) 5,245 10.93 
President 6,888 14.36 
Executive Vice President 7,361 15.34 
Senior Vice President 7,347 15.31 
Vice President 6,543 13.64 
Others 5,036 10.50 
Total 47,976 100.00 
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TABLE 1 (Cont’d)
Panel C: Sample and Descriptive Statistics
Variables Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Q1 Q3
RM_CFO 11,994 -0.002 -0.002 0.084 -0.047 0.041
RM_PROD 11,994 -0.003 0.002 0.173 -0.092 0.087
RM_DISX 11,994 -0.002 0.009 0.184 -0.083 0.094
RM1 11,994 -0.006 0.010 0.336 -0.162 0.168
RM2 11,994 -0.004 0.005 0.202 -0.101 0.102
Exec_Horizon 11,994 12.697 13.000 6.462 9.000 17.000
Exec_PayRatio 11,994 0.558 0.436 0.514 0.324 0.596
Int_Governance 11,994 0.000 -0.132 1.468 -0.782 0.578
CEO_Horizon 11,994 9.496 10.000 7.800 5.000 15.000
CEO_Comp 11,994 7.867 7.848 1.075 7.095 8.610
CEO_PPS 11,994 0.285 0.211 0.236 0.106 0.393
Firm_Age 11,994 22.941 17.000 18.796 9.000 31.000
N_Analyst 11,994 11.070 9.000 7.833 5.000 15.000
ROA 11,994 0.055 0.061 0.105 0.022 0.105
Size 11,994 7.345 7.180 1.518 6.244 8.324
B/M 11,994 0.505 0.424 0.382 0.261 0.649
Leverage 11,994 0.512 0.514 0.218 0.357 0.645
             
Notes to Table 1:
RM_CFO is a real earnings management proxy that negatively affects cash flow from 
operations. RM_PROD is a real earnings management proxy that negatively affects 
production. RM_DISX is a real earnings management proxy that negatively affects 
discretionary expenses. RM1 and RM2 are aggregate measures of real earnings 
management. Exec_Horizon is the subordinate executives’ decision horizon. Exec_PayRatio 
is the subordinate executives’ ability to influence the CEO. Int_Governance is the firm’s 
overall internal governance, measured as the sum of the standardized value of Exec_Horizon
and Exec_PayRatio.  CEO_Horizon is the CEO’s decision horizon. CEO_Comp is the CEO’s 
logged total compensation. CEO_PPS is the pay-for-performance sensitivity of the CEO’s 
portfolio of equity. Firm_Age is the age of the firm. N_Analyst is the number of analysts 
following the firm. ROA is the return on assets in the current fiscal year. Size is the logged 
value of total assets in the current fiscal year. B/M is the book-to-market ratio in the current 
fiscal year. Leverage is the leverage ratio in the current fiscal year. 
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TABLE 2
Pearson Correlation Table
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
1 RM_CFO
1.0
0
2 RM_PROD
0.4
3
1.0
0
3 RM_DISX
0.0
0
0.7
5
1.0
0
4 RM1
0.2
2
0.9
3
0.9
4
1.0
0
5 RM2
0.4
2
0.8
7
0.9
0
0.9
5
1.0
0
6 Exec_Horizon
0.0
0
-
0.0
5
-
0.0
8
-
0.0
7
-
0.0
7
1.0
0
7 Exec_PayRatio
0.0
1
-
0.0
1
-
0.0
3
-
0.0
2
-
0.0
2
0.0
8
1.0
0
8 Int_Governance
0.0
0
-
0.0
4
-
0.0
7
-
0.0
6
-
0.0
6
0.7
3
0.7
3
1.0
0
9 CEO_Horizon
0.0
2
-
0.0
3
-
0.0
6
-
0.0
5
-
0.0
5
0.1
6
0.0
5
0.1
5
1.0
0
1
0 CEO_Comp
-
0.0
7
-
0.0
3
0.0
0
-
0.0
2
-
0.0
3
-
0.0
5
-
0.4
5
-
0.3
4
-
0.0
3
1.0
0
1
1 CEO_PPS
-
0.1
3
-
0.0
6
-
0.0
2
-
0.0
4
-
0.0
7
0.1
2
0.2
8
0.2
8
-
0.0
6
0.0
5
1.0
0
1
2 Firm_Age
0.0
1
0.0
0
0.0
1
0.0
1
0.0
2
-
0.2
6
-
0.1
3
-
0.2
7
-
0.1
8
0.2
9
-
0.1
3
1.0
0
1
3 N_Analyst
-
0.1
9
-
0.1
2
-
0.0
4
-
0.0
9
-
0.1
2
-
0.0
2
0.0
2
0.0
0
-
0.0
1
0.4
3
0.2
5
0.1
5
1.0
0
1
4 ROA
-
0.4
9
-
0.2
9
0.0
6
-
0.1
2
-
0.1
6
-
0.0
5
-
0.0
5
-
0.0
7
-
0.0
6
0.0
6
0.1
5
0.0
4
0.2
0
1.0
0
1
5 Size
-
0.0
4
0.0
5
0.0
9
0.0
8
0.0
6
-
0.1
7
-
0.0
7
-
0.1
6
-
0.1
1
0.6
6
0.1
4
0.4
6
0.6
2
0.0
6
1.0
0
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1
6 B/M
0.2
3
0.2
1
0.0
9
0.1
6
0.1
8
-
0.0
2
-
0.0
4
-
0.0
4
-
0.0
2
-
0.1
0
-
0.2
0
-
0.0
1
-
0.2
7
-
0.3
1
-
0.0
7
1.0
0
1
7 Leverage
0.2
0
0.1
3
0.0
4
0.0
9
0.1
2
-
0.0
9
-
0.0
7
-
0.1
0
-
0.0
3
0.2
1
-
0.1
7
0.2
3
0.0
2
-
0.2
6
0.3
7
-
0.1
1
1.0
0
                                     
Notes to Table 2:
RM_CFO is a real earnings management proxy that negatively affects cash flow from operations. RM_PROD is a real earnings 
management proxy that negatively affects production. RM_DISX is a real earnings management proxy that negatively affects 
discretionary expenses. RM1 and RM2 are aggregate measures of real earnings management. Exec_Horizon is the subordinate 
executives’ decision horizon. Exec_PayRatio is the subordinate executives’ ability to influence the CEO. Int_Governance is the 
firm’s overall internal governance, measured as the sum of the standardized value of Exec_Horizon and Exec_PayRatio.  
CEO_Horizon is the CEO’s decision horizon. CEO_Comp is the CEO’s logged total compensation. CEO_PPS is the pay-for-
performance sensitivity of the CEO’s portfolio of equity. Firm_Age is the age of the firm. N_Analyst is the number of analysts 
following the firm. ROA is the return on assets in the current fiscal year. Size is the logged value of total assets in the current 
fiscal year. B/M is the book-to-market ratio in the current fiscal year. Leverage is the leverage ratio in the current fiscal year. All 
correlations except those in shaded cells are statistically significant at the 0.05 level or better.
69
TABLE 3
Internal Governance and Real Earnings Management
Panel A: Key Executives' Decision Horizon, Power and Real Earnings Management
Pre
d. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
H1 RM_CFO RM_PROD RM_DISX RM1 RM2
Coef.
t-
stats Coef.
t-
stats Coef.
t-
stats Coef.
t-
stats Coef.
t-
stats
Exec_Horizon ― -0.010 -0.66 -0.108 -2.45 ***
-
0.142 -2.90 *** -0.248 -2.75 *** -0.142 -2.69 ***
Exec_PayRatio ― -0.308 -1.46 * -2.283 -3.92 ***
-
2.762 -3.81 *** -5.108 -4.06 *** -3.010 -4.13 ***
CEO_Horizon 0.006 0.45 -0.045 -1.19
-
0.097 -2.04 ** -0.144 -1.74 * -0.093 -1.98 **
CEO_Comp -0.351 -2.34 ** -2.120 -4.07 ***
-
2.536 -4.54 *** -4.726 -4.51 *** -2.906 -5.08 ***
CEO_PPS -0.008 -0.02 0.901 0.61
-
0.212 -0.12 0.808 0.25 -0.241 -0.12
Firm_Age 0.006 1.13 -0.069 -3.43 ***
-
0.083 -3.67 *** -0.152 -3.65 *** -0.076 -3.19 ***
N_Analyst -0.132 -7.06 *** -0.344 -5.97 ***
-
0.367 -6.01 *** -0.716 -6.26 *** -0.497 -7.67 ***
ROA -33.550
-
16.20 *** -36.110 -9.49 ***
21.71
0 5.58 *** -14.840 -2.12 ** -14.610 -3.37 ***
Size 0.404 3.11 *** 3.169 7.16 *** 3.620 7.74 *** 6.858 7.82 *** 4.000 8.35 ***
B/M 2.429 7.11 *** 6.357 6.16 *** 5.430 6.06 *** 11.810 6.27 *** 7.486 7.32 ***
Leverage 4.724 7.31 *** 5.377 2.80 *** 4.461 2.16 ** 9.788 2.62 *** 8.865 4.38 ***
Industry and Year 
FE YES YES YES YES YES
Adjusted R2 0.280 0.139 0.060 0.078 0.100
Observations 11,994 11,994
11,99
4 11,994 11,994
Panel B: Overall Internal Governance and Real Earnings Management
Pre
d. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
H1 RM_CFO RM_PROD RM_DISX RM1 RM2
Coef.
t-
stats Coef.
t-
stats Coef.
t-
stats Coef.
t-
stats Coef.
t-
stats
Int_Governance ― -0.102 -1.36 * -0.893 -4.26 ***
-
1.124 -4.63 *** -2.021 -4.61 *** -1.174 -4.49 ***
CEO_Horizon 0.006 0.45 -0.045 -1.19
-
0.096 -2.04 ** -0.143 -1.74 * -0.092 -1.98 **
CEO_Comp -0.307 -2.06 ** -1.902 -4.22 ***
-
2.306 -4.94 *** -4.256 -4.80 *** -2.616 -5.37 ***
CEO_PPS -0.041 -0.10 0.736 0.49 - -0.21 0.455 0.14 -0.460 -0.23
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0.385
Firm_Age 0.006 1.09 -0.070 -3.52 ***
-
0.085 -3.76 *** -0.155 -3.74 *** -0.077 -3.29 ***
N_Analyst -0.132 -7.03 *** -0.345 -5.98 ***
-
0.368 -6.02 *** -0.718 -6.27 *** -0.498 -7.68 ***
ROA -33.530
-
16.16 *** -36.010 -9.46 ***
21.82
0 5.59 *** -14.610 -2.09 ** -14.470 -3.33 ***
Size 0.384 3.11 *** 3.070 7.09 *** 3.516 7.79 *** 6.646 7.79 *** 3.869 8.29 ***
B/M 2.438 7.22 *** 6.403 6.17 *** 5.479 6.05 *** 11.900 6.27 *** 7.547 7.32 ***
Leverage 4.730 7.32 *** 5.405 2.81 *** 4.491 2.17 ** 9.848 2.63 *** 8.902 4.39 ***
Industry and Year 
FE YES YES YES YES YES
Adjusted R2 0.280 0.139 0.060 0.078 0.100
Observations 11,994 11,994
11,99
4 11,994 11,994
 
TABLE 3 (Cont’d)
Notes to Table 3:
RM_CFO is a real earnings management proxy that negatively affects cash flow from operations. RM_PROD is a real earnings 
management proxy that negatively affects production. RM_DISX is a real earnings management proxy that negatively affects 
discretionary expenses. RM1 and RM2 are aggregate measures of real earnings management. All measures of real earnings 
management are multiplied by 100 for the ease of exposition. Exec_Horizon is the subordinate executives’ decision horizon. 
Exec_PayRatio is the subordinate executives’ ability to influence the CEO. Int_Governance is the firm’s overall internal 
governance, measured as the sum of the standardized value of Exec_Horizon and Exec_PayRatio.  CEO_Horizon is the CEO’s 
decision horizon. CEO_Comp is the CEO’s logged total compensation. CEO_PPS is the pay-for-performance sensitivity of the 
CEO’s portfolio of equity. Firm_Age is the age of the firm. N_Analyst is the number of analysts following the firm. ROA is the 
return on assets in the current fiscal year. Size is the logged value of total assets in the current fiscal year. B/M is the book-to-
market ratio in the current fiscal year. Leverage is the leverage ratio in the current fiscal year. Standard errors are corrected for 
cross-sectional and time-series dependence (Petersen 2009; Gow et al. 2010). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 
the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level or better, respectively (one-tailed test where there is a prediction, two-tailed test otherwise). 
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TABLE 4
Internal Governance and Real Earnings Management – Partitioned
by Suspect and Non-Suspect Firms
Panel A: Suspect Firms
(1) (2)
Pred. RM1 RM2
Coef.
t-
stat
s Coef.
t-
stat
s
Int_Governance ―
-
1.857
-
3.83
**
*
-
1.229
-
4.37
**
*
CEO_Horizon
-
0.125
-
1.38
-
0.086
-
1.71 *
CEO_Comp
-
4.725
-
4.54
**
*
-
2.967
-
5.24
**
*
CEO_PPS
-
0.376
-
0.10
-
0.781
-
0.34
Firm_Age
-
0.169
-
3.61
**
*
-
0.086
-
3.28
**
*
N_Analyst
-
0.653
-
5.20
**
*
-
0.471
-
6.55
**
*
ROA
-
26.55
0
-
2.44 **
-
19.24
0
-
3.03
**
*
Size 6.573 7.05
**
* 3.892 7.43
**
*
B/M
18.07
0 5.58
**
*
11.59
0 6.22
**
*
Leverage
14.05
0 2.86
**
*
11.16
0 4.09
**
*
Industry and Year FE YES YES
Adjusted R2 0.095 0.117
Observations 7,701 7,701
Panel B: Non-Suspect Firms
(1) (2)
Pred. RM1 RM2
Coef.
t-
stat
s Coef.
t-
stat
s
Int_Governance ―
-
0.994
-
1.26
-
0.329
-
0.81
CEO_Horizon
-
0.123
-
0.83
-
0.068
-
0.88
CEO_Comp
-
1.677
-
1.19
-
1.048
-
1.35
CEO_PPS 5.025 0.78 1.712 0.46
Firm_Age
-
0.135
-
2.66
**
*
-
0.065
-
2.32 **
N_Analyst
-
0.736
-
3.31
**
*
-
0.470
-
3.88
**
*
ROA 7.187 0.93
-
3.661
-
0.87
Size 4.481 3.09
**
* 2.451 3.66
**
*
B/M 7.076 4.84
**
* 4.421 4.25
**
*
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Leverage
10.43
0 1.87 *
10.08
0 3.51
**
*
Industry and Year FE YES YES
Adjusted R2 0.051 0.053
Observations 1,803 1,803
 
Notes to Table 4:
Suspect firms are firm-years with earnings surprise between 0 and 1 percent of stock 
price, while Non-Suspect firms are firm-years with earnings surprise less than -0.5 
percent of stock price or more than 1 percent of stock price. RM1 and RM2 are aggregate
measures of real earnings management. All measures of real earnings management are 
multiplied by 100 for the ease of exposition. Int_Governance is the firm’s overall internal 
governance, measured as the sum of the standardized value of Exec_Horizon and 
Exec_PayRatio.  CEO_Horizon is the CEO’s decision horizon. CEO_Comp is the CEO’s 
logged total compensation. CEO_PPS is the pay-for-performance sensitivity of the CEO’s 
portfolio of equity. Firm_Age is the age of the firm. N_Analyst is the number of analysts 
following the firm. ROA is the return on assets in the current fiscal year. Size is the 
logged value of total assets in the current fiscal year. B/M is the book-to-market ratio in 
the current fiscal year. Leverage is the leverage ratio in the current fiscal year. Standard 
errors are corrected for cross-sectional and time-series dependence (Petersen 2009; Gow
et al. 2010). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level 
or better, respectively (one-tailed test where there is a prediction, two-tailed test 
otherwise). 
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TABLE 5
Alternative Measure of Key Executives' Influence and Real Earnings Management
Panel A:Key Executives' Abnormal Compensation
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Pred. RM1 RM2 RM1 RM2
Coef.
t-
stat
s Coef.
t-
stat
s Coef.
t-
stat
s Coef.
t-
stat
s
Exec_Horizon ― -0.219
-
2.11 ** -0.150
-
2.50
**
*
Exec_AbComp ― -4.807
-
1.77 ** -3.781
-
2.26 **
Int_Governance ― -1.268
-
2.73
**
* -0.925
-
3.29
**
*
CEO_Horizon -0.165
-
1.82 * -0.109
-
2.18 ** -0.166
-
1.83 * -0.109
-
2.19 **
CEO_Comp -2.508
-
2.76
**
* -1.453
-
2.86
**
* -2.433
-
2.64
**
* -1.432
-
2.77
**
*
CEO_PPS -1.326
-
0.34 -1.305
-
0.55 -1.317
-
0.34 -1.302
-
0.55
Firm_Age -0.165
-
3.49
**
* -0.085
-
3.14
**
* -0.165
-
3.49
**
* -0.084
-
3.13
**
*
N_Analyst -0.652
-
5.09
**
* -0.474
-
6.38
**
* -0.652
-
5.09
**
* -0.475
-
6.38
**
*
ROA
-
24.56
0
-
2.14 **
-
18.42
0
-
2.70
**
*
-
24.62
0
-
2.15 **
-
18.43
0
-
2.70
**
*
Size 5.825 6.12
**
* 3.397 6.41
**
* 5.820 6.11
**
* 3.395 6.40
**
*
B/M
19.19
0 5.86
**
*
12.28
0 6.49
**
*
19.22
0 5.85
**
*
12.29
0 6.47
**
*
Leverage
15.56
0 3.22
**
*
11.86
0 4.31
**
*
15.49
0 3.21
**
*
11.84
0 4.30
**
*
Industry and Year FE YES YES YES YES
Adjusted R2 0.094 0.118 0.094 0.118
Observations 7,441 7,441 7,441 7,441
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TABLE 5 (Cont’d)
Panel B:Key Executives' Independent Directorships in Other Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pred. RM1 RM2 RM1 RM2
Coef.
t-
stat
s Coef.
t-
stat
s Coef.
t-
stat
s Coef.
t-
stat
s
Exec_Horizon
― -0.224
-
2.16 ** -0.154
-
2.57
**
* -0.207
-
2.00 ** -0.143
-
2.39
**
*
Other_Director
― -2.059
-
2.44
**
* -1.281
-
2.55
**
* -2.022
-
2.44
**
* -1.258
-
2.57
**
*
Exec_PayRatio
― -5.321
-
3.86
**
* -3.394
-
4.39
**
*
CEO_Horizon -0.143
-
1.56 -0.097
-
1.91 * -0.128
-
1.40 -0.087
-
1.74 *
CEO_Comp -3.371
-
3.56
**
* -2.070
-
4.00
**
* -5.392
-
4.65
**
* -3.359
-
5.27
**
*
CEO_PPS -2.270
-
0.60 -2.011
-
0.88 -0.067
-
0.02 -0.606
-
0.27
Firm_Age -0.158
-
3.39
**
* -0.080
-
3.03
**
* -0.162
-
3.49
**
* -0.083
-
3.14
**
*
N_Analyst -0.674
-
5.39
**
* -0.484
-
6.76
**
* -0.646
-
5.21
**
* -0.466
-
6.59
**
*
ROA
-
25.79
0
-
2.35 **
-
18.74
0
-
2.93
**
*
-
26.74
0
-
2.47 **
-
19.35
0
-
3.06
**
*
Size 6.250 6.55
**
* 3.668 6.72
**
* 7.012 7.24
**
* 4.155 7.61
**
*
B/M
18.33
0 5.61
**
*
11.76
0 6.25
**
*
17.77
0 5.49
**
*
11.41
0 6.08
**
*
Leverage
14.20
0 2.90
**
*
11.27
0 4.13
**
*
13.78
0 2.81
**
*
11.00
0 4.05
**
*
Industry and Year FE YES YES YES YES
Adjusted R2 0.093 0.115 0.097 0.118
Observations 7,701 7,701 7,701 7,701
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Notes to Table 5:
RM1 and RM2 are aggregate measures of real earnings management. All measures of real earnings management are multiplied by 100 for
the ease of exposition. Exec_Horizon is the subordinate executives’ decision horizon. Exec_AbComp is the logged (1 + abnormal 
compensation + sample minimum abnormal compensation), where abnormal compensation is defined as the residual from a regression of
executives’ mean total compensation on known determinants of CEO Pay (logged sales, S&P500 membership, book-to-market, returns 
and lagged returns, ROA and lagged ROA, and industry and year fixed effects). Int_Governance is the firm’s overall internal governance, 
measured as the sum of the standardized value of Exec_Horizon and Exec_AbComp. Other_Director is the number of independent 
directorships in other firms held by key subordinate executives. Exec_PayRatio is the subordinate executives’ ability to influence the CEO. 
CEO_Horizon is the CEO’s decision horizon. CEO_Comp is the CEO’s logged total compensation. CEO_PPS is the pay-for-performance 
sensitivity of the CEO’s portfolio of equity. Firm_Age is the age of the firm. N_Analyst is the number of analysts following the firm. ROA is 
the return on assets in the current fiscal year. Size is the logged value of total assets in the current fiscal year. B/M is the book-to-market 
ratio in the current fiscal year. Leverage is the leverage ratio in the current fiscal year. Standard errors are corrected for cross-sectional 
and time-series dependence (Petersen 2009; Gow et al. 2010). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 
level or better, respectively (one-tailed test where there is a prediction, two-tailed test otherwise).
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TABLE 6
Internal Governance and Real Earnings Management -
Instrumental Variables (2SLS) Approach
(1) (2) (3)
Pre
d. Int_Governance RM1 RM2
Coef
.
t-
stats Coef.
t-
stats Coef.
t-
stats
Predicted_Int_Governance ― -3.075 -3.35 *** -2.225 -4.32 ***
CEO_Horizon
0.00
0 -0.15 -0.154 -1.64 -0.080 -1.56
CEO_Comp
-
0.47
1
-
14.6
6
**
* -5.466 -4.41 *** -3.584 -5.16 ***
CEO_PPS
0.56
8 6.76
**
* 0.325 0.07 0.041 0.02
Firm_Age
-
0.00
4 -3.42
**
* -0.179 -3.53 *** -0.090 -3.17 ***
N_Analyst
0.00
9 2.70
**
* -0.574 -4.03 *** -0.434 -5.24 ***
ROA
-
0.04
8 -0.19
-
30.50
0 -2.33 **
-
22.440 -2.84 ***
Size
0.13
7 5.46
**
* 6.760 6.33 *** 4.082 6.93 ***
B/M
-
0.09
6 -1.22
17.93
0 5.49 *** 11.200 5.90 ***
Leverage
-
0.06
2 -0.45
15.25
0 3.00 *** 11.710 4.16 ***
Lagged_Int_Governance
0.55
9
27.4
6
**
*
Ind-Year-
Median_Int_Governance
0.46
4 9.70
**
*
Outside_CEO 0.10
3 2.75
**
*
Named_Exec 0.01
4 0.90
Industry and Year FE YES YES YES
Adjusted R2
0.57
1 0.109 0.136
Observations 5,61
1 5,611 5,611
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 
statistic
303.
29 ***
303.
29 ***
(Weak identification test)
Hansen J-statistic 5.19
7
5.49
9
(Over-identification test of 
all instr.)
 
Notes to Table 6:
RM1 and RM2 are aggregate measures of real earnings management. All measures of 
real earnings management are multiplied by 100 for the ease of exposition. 
Int_Governance is the firm’s overall internal governance, measured as the sum of the 
standardized value of Exec_Horizon and Exec_PayRatio. CEO_Horizon is the CEO’s 
decision horizon. CEO_Comp is the CEO’s logged total compensation. CEO_PPS is the pay-
for-performance sensitivity of the CEO’s portfolio of equity. Firm_Age is the age of the 
firm. N_Analyst is the number of analysts following the firm. ROA is the return on assets 
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in the current fiscal year. Size is the logged value of total assets in the current fiscal 
year. B/M is the book-to-market ratio in the current fiscal year. Leverage is the leverage 
ratio in the current fiscal year. Lagged_Int_Governance is the one-year lagged value of 
internal governance. Ind-Year-Median_Int_Governance is the industry-year median value 
of internal governance. Outside_CEO is an indicator equals one if the current CEO is 
recruited from outside, and zero otherwise. Named_Exec is the number of named 
executives in the annual proxy statement besides the CEO.  Standard errors are 
corrected for cross-sectional and time-series dependence (Petersen 2009; Gow et al. 
2010). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level or 
better, respectively (one-tailed test where there is a prediction, two-tailed test 
otherwise). 
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TABLE 7
Real Earnings Management surrounding the New External
Appointment of Subordinate Executives as Independent Directors
(1) (2)
Pred
. RM1 RM2
Coef.
t-
stats Coef.
t-
stats
Exec_Horizon ― -0.272 -2.73 *** -0.178 -3.11 ***
CID_Firm 1.925 0.75 1.433 1.01
Post_CID_Firm ― -5.079 -2.42 *** -3.243 -2.75 ***
CEO_Horizon -0.100 -1.07 -0.071 -1.36
CEO_Comp -3.560 -3.68 *** -2.199 -4.27 ***
CEO_PPS -2.662 -0.68 -2.192 -0.93
Firm_Age -0.130 -2.76 *** -0.063 -2.39 **
N_Analyst -0.759 -5.98 *** -0.534 -7.19 ***
ROA -20.560 -1.77 * -15.660 -2.34 **
Size 6.648 6.66 *** 3.893 6.72 ***
B/M 17.680 5.50 *** 11.310 6.41 ***
Leverage 12.420 2.38 ** 10.140 3.54 ***
Industry and Year FE YES YES
Adjusted R2 0.091 0.111
Observations 6,675 6,675
 
Notes to Table 7:
RM1 and RM2 are aggregate measures of real earnings management. All measures of 
real earnings management are multiplied by 100 for the ease of exposition. Exec_Horizon
is the subordinate executives’ decision horizon. CID_Firm is an indicator equals one if the 
firm has at least one key executive who holds independent directorships in other firms 
during the sample period, and zero otherwise. Post_CID_Firm is an indicator equals one 
for firm-years after the key executive is appointed as an independent director in other 
firms, and zero otherwise. CEO_Horizon is the CEO’s decision horizon. CEO_Comp is the 
CEO’s logged total compensation. CEO_PPS is the pay-for-performance sensitivity of the 
CEO’s portfolio of equity. Firm_Age is the age of the firm. N_Analyst is the number of 
analysts following the firm. ROA is the return on assets in the current fiscal year. Size is 
the logged value of total assets in the current fiscal year. B/M is the book-to-market ratio 
in the current fiscal year. Leverage is the leverage ratio in the current fiscal year. 
Standard errors are corrected for cross-sectional and time-series dependence (Petersen 
2009; Gow et al. 2010). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 
and 0.10 level or better, respectively (one-tailed test where there is a prediction, two-
tailed test otherwise).
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TABLE 8
Internal Governance and Real Earnings Management conditioning
on Key Executives’ Contribution
Panel A: Industry Research and Development Intensity
Pred. (1) (2)
H2 RM1 RM2
Coef.
t-
stats Coef.
t-
stats
Int_Governance
-
0.44
9
-
0.78
-
0.39
5 -1.18
IND_RD -
2.00
5
-
2.16 **
-
1.33
5 -2.26 **
Int_Governance × IND_RD
―
-
2.68
8
-
2.58
**
*
-
1.59
2 -2.90
**
*
Controls YES YES
Industry and Year FE YES YES
Adjusted R2 0.09
8
0.12
0
Observations 7,70
0
7,70
0
Panel B: Factor Analysis of Geographical Operating Complexity
Pred. (1) (2)
H2 RM1 RM2
Coef.
t-
stats Coef.
t-
stats
Int_Governance
-
1.01
2
-
1.79 *
-
0.63
8 -1.95 *
GEO_Complexy -
7.97
1
-
4.11
**
*
-
4.65
4 -4.08
**
*
Int_Governance × 
GEO_Complexy ―
-
1.59
9
-
1.63 *
-
1.14
2 -2.00 **
Controls YES YES
Industry and Year FE YES YES
Adjusted R2 0.10
5
0.12
7
Observations 7,70
1
7,70
1
 
Notes to Table 8:
RM1 and RM2 are aggregate measures of real earnings management. All measures of 
real earnings management are multiplied by 100 for the ease of exposition. 
Int_Governance is the firm’s overall internal governance, measured as the sum of the 
standardized value of Exec_Horizon and Exec_PayRatio. IND_RD is indicator equals one 
(zero) if the average R&D intensity in the industry year is above (below) the sample 
median. GEO_Complexy is an indicator equals one (zero) if the firm-year observation is 
above (below) the median first principle component of the following three variables: 1) 
number of geographical segments; 2) geographical sales concentration and; 3) 
percentage of foreign sales. CEO_Horizon is the CEO’s decision horizon. CEO_Comp is the
CEO’s logged total compensation. CEO_PPS is the pay-for-performance sensitivity of the 
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CEO’s portfolio of equity. Firm_Age is the age of the firm. N_Analyst is the number of 
analysts following the firm. ROA is the return on assets in the current fiscal year. Size is 
the logged value of total assets in the current fiscal year. B/M is the book-to-market ratio 
in the current fiscal year. Leverage is the leverage ratio in the current fiscal year. 
Standard errors are corrected for cross-sectional and time-series dependence (Petersen 
2009; Gow et al. 2010). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 
and 0.10 level or better, respectively (one-tailed test where there is a prediction, two-
tailed test otherwise).
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TABLE 9
Internal Governance and Real Earnings Management conditioning
on CEO Power
Panel A: Board Independence
Pred. (1) (2)
H3 RM1 RM2
Coef.
t-
stats Coef.
t-
stats
Int_Governance
-
1.41
9
-
2.46 **
-
0.90
2 -2.71
**
*
BD_IND -
5.78
2
-
4.53
**
*
-
3.49
3 -4.67
**
*
Int_Governance × BD_IND
―
-
1.11
1
-
1.55 *
-
0.95
3 -2.38
**
*
Controls YES YES
Industry and Year FE YES YES
Adjusted R2 0.10
8
0.13
2
Observations 4,79
6
4,79
6
Panel B: Institutional Ownership
Pred. (1) (2)
H3 RM1 RM2
Coef.
t-
stats Coef.
t-
stats
Int_Governance
-
1.66
9
-
2.49 **
-
1.18
9 -3.31
**
*
Inst_Own 1.08
0 0.71
1.08
3 1.26
Int_Governance × Inst_Own
―
-
1.39
8
-
1.58 *
-
0.76
3 -1.52 *
Controls YES YES
Industry and Year FE YES YES
Adjusted R2 0.10
2
0.12
7
Observations 6,73
1
6,73
1
Panel C: New Outside CEO
Pred. (1) (2)
H3 RM1 RM2
Coef.
t-
stats Coef.
t-
stats
Int_Governance
-
1.21
7
-
2.36 **
-
0.87
1 -2.98
**
*
New_OutsideCEO -
2.90
6
-
0.99
-
1.40
0 -0.83
Int_Governance × ― - - ** - -2.50 **
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New_OutsideCEO 3.703 3.21 *
1.85
8 *
Controls YES YES
Industry and Year FE YES YES
Adjusted R2 0.09
5
0.11
8
Observations 7,18
1
7,18
1
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TABLE 9 (Cont’d)
Notes to Table 9:
RM1 and RM2 are aggregate measures of real earnings management. All measures of 
real earnings management are multiplied by 100 for the ease of exposition. 
Int_Governance is the firm’s overall internal governance, measured as the sum of the 
standardized value of Exec_Horizon and Exec_PayRatio. BD_IND is an indicator equals 
one (zero) if the firm-year observation is above (below) the median percentage of 
independent director. Inst_Own is an indicator equals one (zero) if the firm-year 
observation is above (below) the median institutional ownership. New_OutsideCEO is an 
indicator equals one if the CEO is recruited from outside and the CEO’s tenure is less 
than three years, zero otherwise. CEO_Horizon is the CEO’s decision horizon. CEO_Comp 
is the CEO’s logged total compensation. CEO_PPS is the pay-for-performance sensitivity 
of the CEO’s portfolio of equity. Firm_Age is the age of the firm. N_Analyst is the number 
of analysts following the firm. ROA is the return on assets in the current fiscal year. Size 
is the logged value of total assets in the current fiscal year. B/M is the book-to-market 
ratio in the current fiscal year. Leverage is the leverage ratio in the current fiscal year. 
Standard errors are corrected for cross-sectional and time-series dependence (Petersen 
2009; Gow et al. 2010). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 
and 0.10 level or better, respectively (one-tailed test where there is a prediction, two-
tailed test otherwise).
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TABLE 10
Internal Governance and Real Earnings Management conditioning
on the Benefits of Meeting or Beating Earnings Expectations
Panel A: Financial distress
Pred. (1) (2)
H4 RM1 RM2
Coef.
t-
stat
s Coef.
t-
stat
s
Int_Governance
-
1.840
-
3.57 ***
-
1.232
-
4.13 ***
Distress -
2.166
-
0.97
-
0.717
-
0.51
Int_Governance × Distress + 2.747 1.90 ** 1.786 2.22 **
Controls YES YES
Industry and Year FE YES YES
Adjusted R2 0.092 0.115
Observations 7,465 7,465
Panel B: Habitual Beater
Pred. (1) (2)
H4 RM1 RM2
Coef.
t-
stat
s Coef.
t-
stat
s
Int_Governance
-
3.003
-
3.93 ***
-
1.768
-
3.98 ***
Hab_Beater 2.194 1.82 * 1.218 1.87 *
Int_Governance × Hab_Beater + 1.519 1.95 ** 0.742 1.58 *
Controls YES YES
Industry and Year FE YES YES
Adjusted R2 0.097 0.118
Observations 7,234 7,234
Panel C: Debt or Equity Issuance
Pred. (1) (2)
H4 RM1 RM2
Coef.
t-
stat
s Coef.
t-
stat
s
Int_Governance
-
2.047
-
3.82 ***
-
1.374
-
4.50 ***
Capital_Issue 3.784 3.58 *** 2.204 3.59 ***
Int_Governance × Capital_Issue + 0.717 1.07 0.561 1.42 *
Controls YES YES
Industry and Year FE YES YES
Adjusted R2 0.097 0.119
Observations 7,701 7,701
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TABLE 10 (Cont’d)
Notes to Table 10:
RM1 and RM2 are aggregate measures of real earnings management. All measures of 
real earnings management are multiplied by 100 for the ease of exposition. 
Int_Governance is the firm’s overall internal governance, measured as the sum of the 
standardized value of Exec_Horizon and Exec_PayRatio. Distress is an indicator equals 
one if the Z-score of the firm is less than 1.81 and the bond rating of the firm is below 
investment grade, and zero otherwise. Hab_Beater is an indicator equals one if the firm 
has meet or beat at least three out of the last four quarters, and at least six out of the 
last eight quarters, and zero otherwise. Capital_Issue is an indicator equals one if the firm
issues debt or equity greater than or equals three percent of market value in the 
following fiscal year, and zero otherwise.  CEO_Horizon is the CEO’s decision horizon. 
CEO_Comp is the CEO’s logged total compensation. CEO_PPS is the pay-for-performance 
sensitivity of the CEO’s portfolio of equity. Firm_Age is the age of the firm. N_Analyst is 
the number of analysts following the firm. ROA is the return on assets in the current 
fiscal year. Size is the logged value of total assets in the current fiscal year. B/M is the 
book-to-market ratio in the current fiscal year. Leverage is the leverage ratio in the 
current fiscal year. Standard errors are corrected for cross-sectional and time-series 
dependence (Petersen 2009; Gow et al. 2010). ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level or better, respectively (one-tailed test where
there is a prediction, two-tailed test otherwise).
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TABLE 11
Internal Governance and Real Earnings Management conditioning
on the passage of SOX
(1) (2)
Pre
d. RM1 RM2
Coef. t-stats Coef. t-stats
Int_Governance -1.171 -2.38 ** -0.775 -2.91 ***
Post_SOX -2.721 -1.02 -1.519 -0.98
Int_Governance × 
Post_SOX ― -1.547 -2.29 ** -1.114 -2.76 ***
CEO_Horizon -0.126 -1.33 -0.083 -1.61
CEO_Comp -4.990 -4.35 *** -3.153 -5.01 ***
CEO_PPS -1.306 -0.32 -1.449 -0.59
Firm_Age -0.175 -3.77 *** -0.092 -3.49 ***
N_Analyst -0.657 -5.19 *** -0.470 -6.41 ***
ROA -33.350 -3.49 *** -22.170 -3.74 ***
Size 6.748 6.93 *** 4.035 7.37 ***
B/M 15.830 4.76 *** 10.350 5.33 ***
Leverage 13.690 2.74 *** 10.890 3.91 ***
Time 0.062 0.29 0.018 0.14
Industry FE YES YES
Adjusted R2 0.097 0.118
Observations 6,929 6,929
 
Notes to Table 11:
RM1 and RM2 are aggregate measures of real earnings management. All measures of 
real earnings management are multiplied by 100 for the ease of exposition. 
Int_Governance is the firm’s overall internal governance, measured as the sum of the 
standardized value of Exec_Horizon and Exec_PayRatio. Post_SOX is an indicator equals 
one if fiscal year is on or after 2002, and zero otherwise. CEO_Horizon is the CEO’s 
decision horizon. CEO_Comp is the CEO’s logged total compensation. CEO_PPS is the pay-
for-performance sensitivity of the CEO’s portfolio of equity. Firm_Age is the age of the 
firm. N_Analyst is the number of analysts following the firm. ROA is the return on assets 
in the current fiscal year. Size is the logged value of total assets in the current fiscal 
year. B/M is the book-to-market ratio in the current fiscal year. Leverage is the leverage 
ratio in the current fiscal year. Time is a time trend variable which equals to the 
difference between the current fiscal year and 1993. Standard errors are corrected for 
cross-sectional and time-series dependence (Petersen 2009; Gow et al. 2010). ***, **, 
and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level or better, 
respectively (one-tailed test where there is a prediction, two-tailed test otherwise).
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TABLE 12
Internal Governance and Real Earnings Management conditioning
on Self-serving CEOs
(1) (2)
Pre
d. RM1 RM2
Coef.
t-
stats Coef.
t-
stats
Int_Governance 0.263 0.41 -0.023 -0.06
Self_Serving_CEO 3.607 1.05 1.809 0.95
Int_Governance × 
Self_Serving_CEO ― -3.835 -4.09 *** -2.182 -3.94 ***
CEO_Horizon -0.150 -1.63 -0.100 -2.00 **
CEO_Comp -4.806 -4.64 *** -3.021 -5.36 ***
CEO_PPS -0.367 -0.10 -0.747 -0.33
Firm_Age -0.165 -3.42 *** -0.084 -3.11 ***
N_Analyst -0.689 -5.44 *** -0.492 -6.74 ***
ROA
-
27.800 -2.58 *** -19.870 -3.14 ***
Size 6.838 7.31 *** 4.033 7.71 ***
B/M 17.740 5.57 *** 11.420 6.15 ***
Leverage 13.560 2.73 *** 11.020 3.97 ***
Industry and Year FE YES YES
Adjusted R2 0.103 0.124
Observations 7,601 7,601
 
Notes to Table 12:
RM1 and RM2 are aggregate measures of real earnings management. All measures of 
real earnings management are multiplied by 100 for the ease of exposition. 
Int_Governance is the firm’s overall internal governance, measured as the sum of the 
standardized value of Exec_Horizon and Exec_PayRatio. Self_Serving_CEO is an indicator 
equals one (zero) if the firm-year observation is above (below) the median first principle 
component of the following two variables: 1) industry homogeneity based on Parrino 
(1997) and; 2) industry competition based on the inverse of industry sales concentration 
ratio. CEO_Horizon is the CEO’s decision horizon. CEO_Comp is the CEO’s logged total 
compensation. CEO_PPS is the pay-for-performance sensitivity of the CEO’s portfolio of 
equity. Firm_Age is the age of the firm. N_Analyst is the number of analysts following the 
firm. ROA is the return on assets in the current fiscal year. Size is the logged value of 
total assets in the current fiscal year. B/M is the book-to-market ratio in the current fiscal 
year. Leverage is the leverage ratio in the current fiscal year. Standard errors are 
corrected for cross-sectional and time-series dependence (Petersen 2009; Gow et al. 
2010). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level or 
better, respectively (one-tailed test where there is a prediction, two-tailed test 
otherwise).
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TABLE 13
Internal Governance and Real Earnings Management conditioning
on Future Option Grants
(1) (2)
Pre
d. RM1 RM2
Coef.
t-
stat
s Coef.
t-
stat
s
Int_Governance (β1) -2.081
-
4.75
**
* -1.206
-
4.61 ***
Future_Option_Grant 0.518 0.25 0.270 0.22
Int_Governance × 
Future_Option_Grant (β2) + 2.939 2.05 ** 1.571 2.12 **
CEO_Horizon -0.141
-
1.71 * -0.091
-
1.95 *
CEO_Comp -4.275
-
4.81
**
* -2.625
-
5.38 ***
CEO_PPS 0.458 0.14 -0.458
-
0.23
Firm_Age -0.155
-
3.74
**
* -0.077
-
3.29 ***
N_Analyst -0.716
-
6.29
**
* -0.497
-
7.72 ***
ROA
-
14.64
0
-
2.09 **
-
14.480
-
3.33 ***
Size 6.662 7.77
**
* 3.878 8.27 ***
B/M
11.89
0 6.25
**
* 7.539 7.28 ***
Leverage 9.846 2.63
**
* 8.900 4.39 ***
Industry and Year FE YES YES
Adjusted R2 0.078 0.100
Observations 11,99
4 11,994
F-test of β1 + β2 = 0 0.35 0.23
 
Notes to Table 13:
RM1 and RM2 are aggregate measures of real earnings management. All measures of 
real earnings management are multiplied by 100 for the ease of exposition. 
Int_Governance is the firm’s overall internal governance, measured as the sum of the 
standardized value of Exec_Horizon and Exec_PayRatio. Future_Option_Grant is an 
indicator variable that equals one if the one-year ahead fixed-date option grant scaled by
salary after the earnings announcement is greater than the sample median and the firm 
misses analyst forecast by a small margin (less than 0.5 percent of stock price) or a large
margin (more than 10 percent of stock price), and zero otherwise. CEO_Horizon is the 
CEO’s decision horizon. CEO_Comp is the CEO’s logged total compensation. CEO_PPS is 
the pay-for-performance sensitivity of the CEO’s portfolio of equity. Firm_Age is the age 
of the firm. N_Analyst is the number of analysts following the firm. ROA is the return on 
assets in the current fiscal year. Size is the logged value of total assets in the current 
fiscal year. B/M is the book-to-market ratio in the current fiscal year. Leverage is the 
leverage ratio in the current fiscal year. Standard errors are corrected for cross-sectional 
and time-series dependence (Petersen 2009; Gow et al. 2010). ***, **, and * indicate 
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statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level or better, respectively (one-tailed 
test where there is a prediction, two-tailed test otherwise).
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